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ABSTRACT
I use economic experiments to investigate individual behavior under uncertainty. The
rst essay examines the consistency of risk preferences over two institutions. The two
institutions I use are the rst price sealed bid auction and a Holt-Laury lottery. There is
some controversy as to whether or not observed overbidding in rst price auction is actually
caused by risk aversion or simply consistent with it. Behavior in the Holt-Laury lottery being
caused by risk aversion is not in dispute. By having the same subjects participate in both
institutions, I show that subjectsrisk preferences in the lottery are consistent with subjects
risk preferences in the auction. This supports the notion that behavior in the rst price sealed
bid auction is in fact driven by risk aversion. I also nd support for the constant relative
risk aversion model (CRRAM). Using CRRAM I nd that the risk parameters derived in
the lottery are consistent with the risk parameters derived in the auction. The second essay
examines how individuals respond to random monitoring. I design a real e¤ort laboratory
experiment with incentives similar to those faced by many workers. Subjects are allowed to
engage two tasks; one task mimics work for an employer, the other task allows for gains due to
shirking. Employee shirking has the potential to be extremely costly to rms. To counter the
productivity loss due to shirking, rms may institute various monitoring schemes. Previous
experimental research has shown that while monitoring does decrease shirking, some subjects
work without explicit nancial incentives. My experimental design corrects for the possibility
of these past results being artifacts of past experimnetal design. I nd that subjects who
are given incentives to shirk do in fact shirk, but monitoring and an attainable quota lead to
increased productivity. However, when the quota is unattainable, subjects revolt and engage
in a high amount of shirking.
ix
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Economic models are built by making certain assumptions about individual preferences.
When an individual will have to make a decision under uncertainty his risk preferences have
to be part of the model. Risk preferences of individuals describe how they view trade-
o¤s for risky propositions and are an integral part of a wide range of economic models
(constant absolute risk aversion, decreasing absolute risk aversion, constant relative risk
aversion, increasing relative risk aversion, hyperbolic absolute risk aversion, etc...). An
important assumption is that an individuals risk preferences are constant across various
situations. This allows for great convenience in modelling behavior across tasks. Should such
parameters be task dependent then much additional study will be required to understand
such behavioral shifts. Recent ndings have shown that risk attitudes may not be consistent
across institutions. If these past ndings are robust, we are in the more di¢ cult situation.
I use economic experiments to explore this issue. I place subjects in two settings that
each allow for the elicitation of their risk preferences. The rst institution is a lottery, and
the second institution is an auction. There is an ongoing debate about whether or not the
risk preferences derived from auctions are truly measuring risk or just some other behavior
that looks like a risk preference. This means I cannot prove inconsistency of risk preferences.
I can only show that the modelling of risk in both institutions is inconsistent. But if I do
nd that the parameters are consistent, not only are people consistent, but their behavior in
auctions can, in fact, be explained by risk preferences. For the institutions that I examine, I
will show that standard assumptions of consistent preferences do quite well. Individuals that
are risk averse in one institution will be risk averse in the other institution. Furthermore,
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I show that a specic model is quite successful at measuring risk attitudes. Its success is
that the specic risk parameter it estimates in one institution is consistent with the risk
parameter it estimates in the other institution.
The second type of behavior under uncertainty that I am concerned with is the situation
where a worker does not know if he will be monitored by his employer. Past economic
experiments have shown that some subjects work without nancial motivation. This result
is in opposition to the traditional economic theory that an individual would not exert costly
e¤ort unless he were to be compensated.
I investigate this issue by designing an experiment with random monitoring. The way
I look at individual behavior under uncertainty is by having individuals participate in an
experiment where the incentive structure is similar to a work environment. The subjects are
told that if they complete some task, they will be assured of earnings. The subjects face
uncertainty in the experiment because they do not know if they will be monitored. This
means that there is some possibility that their work will be checked, but they only know the
probability at which this occurs. The way I have designed my experiment allows for subjects
to make money outside of the money they earn for completing the specied task. Under one
scenario, the incentives allow a worker to get paid whether or not he does his job and he
can make himself better o¤ by doing something else (shirking); he has an incentive to not do
his job. In past experiments, the way a subject shirked was by sitting still. So, if a subject
is bored by sitting still, shirking may actually be more costly to them than working on the
task. My design allows me to test if the past experimental results are artifacts of the past
experimental methodology.
In chapter four I explain specic features of the institutional environment that I have
designed to mimic a work setting with an outside option. I then report the results of subject
behavior in this experiment under various incentive schemes. What I nd is that subjects
do shirk when they are given the incentive to do so. But monitoring reduces shirking.
When there is no monitoring, subjects in my experiment make use of the money making
opportunity they have outside of completing their main task. But when they are monitored,
this behavior decreases. I also nd that requiring too much work may be counter-productive.
By requiring too much work, people may respond by o¤ering less e¤ort than they would if
2
the requirement was lower.
3
CHAPTER 2
Literature Review
2.1 Methodology
This dissertation will make extensive use of experimental methodology. In using such a tool,
it is important to understand its benets and limitations. It will be important to understand
these steps because key issues that I deal with question if certain experimental results are
due to a failure of valid methods or are truly descriptive of individual behavior.
Roth (1987) points out three specic uses for experimental economics. They are: Speaking
to theorists, Searching for facts (meaning), andWhispering in the ears of princes. Speaking
to theorists is concerned with the idea of theory testing. We can think of this in terms
of prescriptive and descriptive economics, where prescriptive refers to what theory predicts
people should do, and descriptive refers to what people actually do (for my purposes, this will
mean what they are actually observed to do in the laboratory). Searching for facts applies
to situations where there does not yet exist mainstream theory and by examining results
from the laboratory, experiments can be thought of as informing theory. This is similar to
the Yogi Berra saying: You can observe a lot just by watching.1 My rst experiment that
tests for consistency of risk attitudes will address both of these points. I will consider the
general question about the consistency of risk preferences, but I will go beyond that and test
if a particular model is successful in deriving consistent risk parameters. Whispering in the
ears of princes suggests that experimenters may be able to use their results to inform policy
1Taleb (2007) mentions that this quote may be apocryphal and actually belong to Niels Bohr.
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decisions.2 The results from my monitoring experiment will point out that monitoring does
work, but that managers will want to pay careful attention to the requirements they are
setting for their employees.
Economic experiments allow for control of variables that are always or at least often
unknown in a natural setting. Smith (1962) runs an experiment called the double auction
where he places subjects into two groups (buyers and sellers) and has buyers announce prices
they are willing to pay and sellers announce prices they are willing to accept. What drives
these bids (willingness to pay) and asks (willingness to sell) is the underlying values that
Smith has induced. This is the key aspect of control. Without this aspect of control, market
observations only allow us to see what happens, but not the underlying variables that are
causing a certain outcome to happen. Smiths results are noted for their consistency with
the supply-and-demand model. Samuelson (2005) suggests that economic experiments were
able to gain their initial footing due to showing that laboratory market results are consistent
with fundamental economic theory.
Another advantage of using economic experiments is that they are replicable. This
allows other researchers to verify and also test variations on elements of a given experiment.
By replicating past experiments, one can show that the incentives of the experiment are
what is driving the results of the experiment. Once past results are veried, modications
can be made to the past experiment to investigate new questions. The common practice
in experimental economics is for experimental instructions and data to be made freely
available. In this regard economic experiments merely follow the lead of the traditional
sciences. Beveridge (1950) writes that the traditional method (Beveridge here is speaking
about natural science experiments) is to have similar groups and to vary one thing at a
time and make a note of all that you do.This is important on two levels when we want
to transfer the concepts from natural science experiments to economic experiments. First,
it allows for the ceteris paribus condition to be met within the framework of the initial
experiment. Second, it allows for modication of instructions for future experiments. Unlike
natural science experiments, there is sometimes the question of whether or not subjects
participating in an economic experiment are being biased by particular instructions. When
2Policy is most commonly used to denote government policy, but can more broadly be interpreted. For
my purposes, I will develop an experiment that could inform the policy of a rm.
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this question arises, the same experiment can be run with modied instructions, and we can
see if past results are robust in the face of this change. It should be noted that economic
experiments do not permit deception. What the instructions state as true is true. One reason
for this is that if subjects know that there is no deception, they know they are responding
to the incentives in the instructions and not hidden incentives. A more practical reason is
that lying to the subjects could e¤ect their willingness to participate in future experiments,
or at the least they would not trust future instructions. This does not mean that subjects
have full information, it simply means they are not lied to. For example, in my experiment,
when subjects are told that something happens with a 15% probability, it happens with 15%
probability.
Besides changing instructions, one could also change the makeup of the subject pool
chosen to participate in the experiment. Currently, most research in experimental economics
uses university students as subjects. This practice has lead to the critique that this
commonality may bias experimental results (Why should we expect university students to
act like professionals?). If it is the case that results are biased, the remedy is simple, the
experimenter can re-run the experiment with a subject pool of professionals. However,
Davis and Holt (1993) provide a list of studies that show that performance of professionals
is in line with that of university students. One particular example (Smith, Suchanek, and
Williams (1988)) nds that both students and professionals are susceptible to bubbles and
crashes in laboratory asset markets. Guillen and Veszteg (2006) investigate this issue in
terms of demographics by examining the characteristics of over 2000 subjects in 74 di¤erent
experiments and nd that demographic di¤erences account for less than 4% of observed
variation.
The subject pool critique is a component of the broader critique concerning the external
validity of economic experiments. This critique applies more so when we are dealing with
Roths classication of whispering in the ears of princes as opposed to speaking to theorist
and searching for facts. This is because, as Plott (1982) points out, any economic model can
be critiqued regarding its external validity. When experiments are used for theory testing
they are set up to give the theory its best chance at success. The idea is that if the theory
cannot survive a laboratory where it is given its best chance, it will be highly unlikely to
survive a natural setting. When experiments are used to search for facts, the external validity
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critique is not warranted because the experiment is not trying to inform policy, but to inform
theory (i.e. experiments are used to help develop theory that can then be scrutinized more
closely in the laboratory). So, we are left with questioning why experiments are valid for
informing policy. This gets us back to the key benet of economic experiments, control.
Plott (1982) describes scenarios where a prosecutor and regulator have to make decisions
about cases to pursue. They may observe data that is consistent with illegal activity, but
they are not certain that it is due to illegal activity. By setting up an economic experiment
where certain variables can be controlled, a better inference can be made as to whether
outcomes that are consistent with illegal activity are actually caused by illegal activity.
Amore theoretical defense for external validity is developed in Smith (1982). Smith makes
a strong case for what he describes as parallelism: propositions of behavior of individuals
and the performance of institutions that have been tested in laboratory microeconomies
apply also to non-laboratory microeconomies where similar ceteris paribus conditions hold.
Smith identies four conditions that lead to parallelism. We can also think of these four
conditions as necessary for a valid experiment. They are: nonsatiation, saliency, dominance,
and privacy. Nonsatiation means that when all else is equal subject would rather have more
of the reward medium than less of it. Saliency means that the money subjects receive in
the experiment depends on how they behave in the experiment, and that the reward is high
enough to motivate the subjects. Dominance means that potential earnings are greater than
any subjective costs of participating in the experiment. Privacy means that a subject only
knows his own induced valuations. By ensuring privacy, the experimenter diminishes the
possibility that subjects will derive utility from elements other than the reward medium.
These last two conditions are necessary for control in the experiment.
The main focus of my dissertation is how people behave when facing uncertainty. One
key aspect of this is deciphering an individuals risk preferences. How an individual behaves
when facing a particular type of uncertainty allows for his risk preference to be classied.
He is either risk averse, risk neutral, or risk loving. Knight (1921) distinguishes two types of
uncertainty. In the literature, this is referred to as the di¤erence between risk and ambiguity.
An individual is dealing with risk when he faces uncertainty, but he knows the odds. An
individual is dealing with ambiguity when he faces uncertainty, but does not know the odds.
An example of this distinction would be gambling with a fair coin (risk) versus gambling
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when it is not known if the coin is fair (ambiguity). It is still an open debate as to how
much this distinction matters. If individuals form probabilistic beliefs about outcomes and
then act, their behavior should be similar in both cases. The experiments in my dissertation
will consider instances where the subjects are informed of the probabilities that exists in all
institutions (e.g. they know the probability of heads versus the probability of tails). This
classication allows for a technical denition of risk and risk preferences.
Imagine that someone is given the choice between 15 dollars for certain, or a gamble using
a fair coin. If the coin ip results in heads he gets 10 dollars, if it results in tails he gets 20
dollars. If he is indi¤erent between this gamble and the certain 15 dollars, he is said to be risk
neutral. If he values the certain 15 dollars more than the lottery he is risk averse, and if he
values the lottery more he is risk loving. More generally, someone who is risk neutral values
things at their expected value. This means that a risk neutral person would have a linear
utility function. With a linear utility function, any line that connects two points will be
traced directly on top of the utility function. So, if the possible lottery outcomes are the two
points under consideration, a straight line connecting them can represent the gamble, and
since we have a 50/50 probability between the high and low value, the midpoint of that line
would be the expected value. That means, that the utility of the expected value is equal to
the expected utility. This is not the case with a concave utility function. A straight line that
connects two points on a concave utility function will sit below the curve. This means that
the expected utility of the gamble is less than the utility of the expected value, so someone
with a concave utility function would prefer the certain $15 over the gamble. Thus, risk
aversion is modelled with a concave utility function. The same argument implies that a risk
loving person can be modelled with a convex utility function. The straight line connecting
two points on a convex utility function would sit above the curve, and the expected utility of
the gamble would be greater than the utility of the expected value. So, a risk lover prefers
the gamble.3
The main issue that I focus on in chapter three is the consistency (or lack of) of individual
risk preferences across institutions. I use economic experiments and place subjects in two
di¤erent institutions to see if they behave similarly in both institutions. I use an auction
3For a survey of the origin and development of this concept see Camerer (1995).
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institution to derive one estimate, and a lottery to derive the other estimate. I will rst
discuss particulars of deriving risk preferences from an auction, and then move on to lotteries.
2.2 Background on Risk Aversion in Auctions
The general facts that I discuss about auctions have been compiled from: Kagel (1995),
McAfee and McMillan (1987), and Wolfstetter (1995). Simply put, auctions are a rationing
device used to allocate goods to the highest bidder (from the standpoint of economic e¢ ciency
this would ideally be the person who valued the item the most). There are many types of
auction institutions, but I will focus on four particular auctions that will allow me to develop
a relationship between auctions and risk preferences. These auctions are: the English auction,
the secondprice-sealed-bid (SPSB) auction, the Dutch auction, and the rst-price-sealed-bid
(FPSB) auction.
In the Japaneseversion of the English auction4, the auctioneer opens the bidding at
some price and everyone is in the auction, the auctioneer calls out higher bids and some
bidders drop out. This goes on until only one willing bidder remains. The optimal strategy
is for a bidder to remain in the auction until his value of the item is surpassed. The winning
bidder will pay whatever the second highest bid plus whatever the bid increment is. For
example, consider the case where two people remain in the auction. Bidder 1 (who values
the item at $100) and Bidder 2 (who values the item at $120) remain in the auction; assume
that the bid increment is ve dollars. When the auctioneer calls out a price of $95 both
bidders remain in the auction, at the price of $100 both would still remain. Once the price
reaches $105 Bidder 1 will drop out and only Bidder 2 will remain. So we see that Bidder
2 wins the auction and pays $105, he is made better of by $15 (his value minus his winning
bid).
In the SPSB auction, bidders place their bids in a sealed envelope and submit them to
the auctioneer. Once the auctioneer has all the bids, he opens them and awards the item to
the owner of the highest bid. The price the winner pays is the second highest submitted bid.
4The more commonly discussed form of the English ascending auction has been shown by Isaac, Salmon
and Zillante (2007) to have a more complex optimal bidding strategy. This stems from the bidders in an
English auction having the ability to bid above the bid increment (this is referred to as jump-bidding).
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The optimal strategy in this auction is for the bidders to submit their true value. We can
see this by focusing on the alternatives. If bidder 1 bids below his value and wins, nothing
changes. He pays the same amount he as if he had bid his true value. If he bids below his
value and loses there is the potential that he has foregone earnings. If a bid of his value
would have been enough to win, by bidding below his value he forgoes his value minus the
winning bid. If he bids above his value and wins, he either pays the same price he would
have if he had bid his value, or he actually loses money. If the second highest bid is above
bidder 1s value, then bidder 1 loses the second highest bid minus his value. So, the SPSB
and the English auction have rather straight forward strategies. Also consider that if the
bid increment is small enough in the English auction, the price paid by the winner would be
the same as in the SPSB (In the English auction the winner pays his bid, but his bid is the
second price plus the bid increment) .
In the Dutch auction, the auctioneer starts the bidding by quoting a price higher than he
believes any of the bidders would be willing to pay. He then lowers the price until someone
is willing to pay. The rst person announcing that he is willing to pay wins the auction.
The winner pays his bid. The optimal strategy is not as straightforward in this auction.
If the bidder claims the item with the simple strategy of bidding his value, he is not made
better o¤ (his value minus his bid is zero). In order to make himself better o¤ he has to win
the item at a price below his value. The longer he waits to claim the item, the larger his
potential prot (value minus bid). However, it is also the case that the longer he waits, the
more likely it is that a rival bidder will claim the item. This is the risky choice in an auction.
Someone who is risk averse is going to want to protect the prot more than someone who is
risk neutral. So, they will not wait as long as a risk neutral bidder to claim the item. The
optimal strategy in this auction is for the bidder to bid some amount below his value. This
will be stated formally later in this section.
The protocol in the rst-price-sealed-bid (FPSB) auction is similar to the SPSB, but the
winner pays his own bid, not the second highest bid. The optimal strategy for the FPSB is
similar to that of the Dutch auction. A bidder will only make a prot if he bids below his
value, but by doing so he lowers the likelihood of winning the auction. We can now move on
to a more technical discussion of what an optimal bid strategy will be in this scenario. We
will see that it is possible to get an estimate of how risk averse a subject is by how much
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they hedge their bid in a FPSB auction. It will then be possible to compare this estimate
with the estimate that I will elicit from another institution.
Vickrey (1961) solved for the optimal bid strategy given certain assumptions. His model
assumes that all bidders are risk neutral and that the distribution of their value space is
known. A bidder already knows his own value, but he only knows the range of the values
that his rivals could have (and that these values come from a uniform distribution). It is also
the case that a bidder knows how many rivals he faces. Given these assumptions Vickrey
shows that the optimal bid is for the bidder to bid some constant proportion of his value
dependent on the number of bidders in the auction. As the number of bidders increases,
optimal bids also increase.
Vickrey, Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981) show that the above four auctions
all yield the same revenue (given the assumptions listed above). This is referred to as the
Revenue Equivalence Theorem. Holt (1980) shows that in a FPSB auction, if someone is
risk averse, they will bid higher than the RNNE.5 Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982) show,
in a laboratory setting, that bids in a FPSB auction are generally above the risk neutral
prediction. This would mean that revenue equivalence would not hold (FPSB auctions would
generate higher revenues than the English auction).6 In the same year, Milgrom and Weber
(1982), with an argument similar to Holt (1980) show generally that individual who are risk
averse will bid above the risk neutral bid. Cox, Roberson and Smith develop a model to deal
with this observed overbidding, but it appears that this was a concurrent nding (as neither
Milgrom and Weber nor Cox, Roberson and Smith cite each other). Cox, Roberson and
Smith state that they are building their model to consider risk aversion on the suggestion
of John Ledyard. The model they develop has come to be known as the constant relative
risk aversion model (CRRAM). CRRAM allows for the risk preferences of the bidders to be
backed out from their observed bidding behavior. Cox, Smith and Walker (1988) further
explored risk preferences in FPSB auctions using the CRRAM. This model will be discussed
5Holt was studying procurement auctions which have the property that the lowest bidder wins the auction
(e.g. contractors bidding to provide a service). He shows that risk averse bidders would bid less than risk
neutral bidders. This means that in an ascending auction (as opposed to a procurement auction), risk averse
bidders will bid above the RNNE.
6Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2006) show that when entry decisions (i.e. subject can choose to enter or
not, so the number of bidders is not xed) are considered the FPSB auction may not generate signicantly
higher revenues.
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in detail in chapter 3.
Harrison (1989) questioned whether or not the experimental methodology used by Cox,
Smith and Walker met the requirements for a valid experiment that were laid out in Smith
(1982). This led to a debate that John D. Hey (1991) said stirred the passions of the
experimental community.Harrison posited that the deviations from risk neutral behavior
that Cox, Smith and Walker observed were too small in the payo¤ space to have any
signicant meaning. This is called the at maximum critique. If we think of subjects
responding to the incentives of an experiment to make money, we can imagine that they
have a function that they are trying to maximize. The at maximum critique is an issue
when subjects can reach the maximum with a range of behavior as opposed to a distinct
behavior. Cox, Smith and Walker (1988) do not have a at maximum, but Harrison argues
that the payo¤ space di¤erences are so small that the incentives in their experiment are not
salient. His point was that there was a loss of dominance since deviations from the RNNE
were not costing subjects much money. Cox, Smith and Walker (1992) and Friedman (1992)
point out that there are technical shortcomings with Harrisons argument. Cox, Smith and
Walker argue that Harrison attaches cardinal value to ordinal utility, and that Harrison does
not get to be the arbiter of what is a small di¤erence in the payo¤ space. Furthermore,
Friedman points out that if what Harrison says is true, then deviations from the RNNE
should fall on both sides of the RNNE, but Cox, Smith and Walker (1988) report that
subjects go in one direction (they consistently bid above the RNNE).
There are alternative explanations for overbidding in a FPSB. These critiques are di¤erent
than Harrisons. To simplify, Harrison was saying that overbidding really wasnt overbidding,
just faulty design. An alternative to this is to acknowledge overbidding, but argue the
causality. That is to say the methodology is ne, but the interpretation and model may not
be right. The rst to make this argument were the authors of CRRAM themselves when
they suggested that subjects possibly receive joy from winning the auction over and above
the monetary gain. They later show that this model (Joy of Winning) does not do as good
a job of explaining behavior as the CRRAM (Cox, Smith and Walker (1988)). Engelbrecht-
Wiggans (1989) studies the e¤ect regret may have on bidding behavior. Subjects can have
two types of regret. If a subject wins the auction, he may feel that he has paid too much and
could have still won by bidding less. If a subject loses the auction, it is possible that he could
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have won if he had bid higher (but still below his value). If this second e¤ect dominates,
overbidding could be the result. Friedman (1992) considers the possibility that subjects just
start out with some ad-hoc rule (bid some percentage of their value) and if given enough time
would eventually correct to the Vickrey RNNE. These arguments share the commonality of
accepting that overbidding occurs, but nd the risk aversion claim dubious. Cason (1993)
and Kagel and Levin (1993) each use di¤erent institutions and do not nd the majority of
their subjects to be risk averse. It should be noted that the institutions used by Cason, and
Kagel and Roth are more complex than the FPSB auction. Kagel (1995) claims that the
complexity should not matter when trying to gauge behavior. I understand his argument
to be something like: people do not need to know economic theory to conform to it, and
if they dont conform to it, then something is amiss with the theory. The problem with
this argument is that complexity can take two forms. In one form Kagels point is valid,
but in the second it may not be. A task can be complex in that it is di¢ cult for subjects
to gure out what to do even if they understand all the rules, or a task may be complex
because the subjects cannot gure out the rules. This latter case, where subjects may not
be sure of the given incentives could lead to questionable results. We will see below that
Kagel (2001) makes a similar argument in a di¤erent context. He will clarify the incentives
in an experiment and in turn get results that are at odds with past experiments.
In this section, we have seen the proposition that overbidding in FPSB auctions is due
to risk aversion. There have been critiques that overbidding doesnt really mean anything
(Harrison (1989)), overbidding does mean something, but it isnt necessarily caused by risk
aversion (Friedman (1992) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1989), Cason (1993) and Kagel and
Levin (1993)). In the next section I will further explore the risk aversion aspects in the FPSB
auction and introduce institutions that have been used to elicit subjectsrisk preferences.
2.3 Procedures for Estimating Risk Aversion
One way to elicit someones risk parameter is to ask him how much he would be willing to pay
for a lottery. We have seen that someone who is willing to pay less than the expected value is
risk averse. The problem with this in a market setting is that it requires truthfulness on the
part of the buyer. If you just ask a person how much they are willing to pay for something,
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he may submit a lowball o¤er. One way to get around this is to ask hypothetically. Now
there is no reason to lie, but there is also no reason to be truthful (we have lost the salient
reward precept). In an attempt to get around these issues, Becker, Degroot, Marschak (1964)
devised what is referred to as the BDM mechanism.
The BDM mechanism is similar to the SPSB auction discussed above, but there are some
key di¤erences. In the BDM the subject is endowed with a lottery, and is then asked for
the minimum price that he would be willing to sell the lottery back to the experimenter.
The experimenter then draws a random number. If the number drawn is greater than the
stated min selling price, the lottery is sold, and the subject receives the value of the random
number. If the random number is lower than the min selling price, the subject plays the
lottery and earns the proceeds. This is similar to the SPSB auction because the optimal
strategy is for the stated min price to be the subjects value. If subjects value their endowed
lottery by more than its expected value, they are said to be risk loving.
Harrison (1990) uses the BDM mechanism to back out his subjectsrisk parameters with
the CRRAM. He uses these results to further question the results found by Cox, Smith and
Walker (1988). He shows that the risk parameters backed out from a di¤erent institution
(BDM) yielded vastly di¤erent estimates. He found that his subjects were much more risk
loving. Harrisons argument is that if subjects are risk neutral/loving in the BDM (as
he found them to be) and preferences are stable (which is commonly assumed) then Cox,
Roberson and Smiths model is not valid. However, an alternative exists. It could be the
case that the di¤erent results were due to Harrison using a di¤erent subject pool, or that
preferences are not stable. Isaac and James (2000) explore this issue by having the same
group of subjects participate in both institutions. On aggregate, they nd that their subjects
act similarly, in the rst price auction, to the subjects in Cox, Smith and Walker, and that
their subjects act similarly, in the BDM, to the subjects in Harrison (1990). Isaac and
James calculate the risk parameter for each individual subject in both institutions, further
they rank the subjects in each institution (from most to least risk averse). Their results show
that neither values nor ranks are preserved across institutions. This raises a few questions.
Do subjects truly have unstable parameters, or is something else at play? Do either of these
devices measure risk aversion? Is the technique used to back out the risk parameter valid, is
it valid for one institution and not the other?
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The model used by Cox, Smith and Walker and followed by Harrison (1990) and Isaac
and James assumes that individuals have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). Kagel et
al. (1987) and Smith and Walker (1993), in contradiction to this, show that as the expected
payo¤ of winning the auction increases subjectsbids increase by more than the CRRAM
would predict. Subject behavior in these studies is consistent with risk aversion, but it
is increasing relative risk aversion not CRRA. Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2000) explore
alternatives explanations of overbidding by trying to estimate parameters with various
models. They nd that the risk aversion model is the best t.
There is strong evidence that subjects in rst price auctions behave, at the least, as if
risk averse (we saw earlier that it is not fully agreed upon that risk is driving behavior in the
FPSB auction but that subjects overbidding is at least consistent with risk averse behavior),
and it is possible to measure this behavior without assuming either constant relative or
increasing relative risk aversion.
Holt and Laury (2002) introduce a new lottery device that also allows for elicitation of
risk preferences. It shares similarities with the BDM discussed above, but there are some
important di¤erences. In the BDM subjects are specically asked how much they value
a gamble and are then incentivized to be truthful. In Holt and Laury (HL) subjects are
presented with a series of two lotteries and asked to choose the one that they prefer. This
gets around any possible confusion a subject may have in calculating a value himself. It is
not a question of how much, just simply pick one or the other. By observing their decisions
over a menu of lottery pairs, it is possible to gauge their risk preference.
Similar to Kagel et al (1987). and Smith and Walker (1993), Holt and Laury nd that
subjectsrisk aversion increases as potential earnings increase. A nice feature of the Holt-
Laury lottery is that while it can be used to get an estimate of subjects risk parameters
under various assumptions of subjectsutility functions, it also allows for some proxy of risk
aversion without assuming an underlying parametric form.
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2.4 Background on Principal-Agent Model and
Experiments
When designing a contract it is often the case that an information asymmetry exists. In
the principal-agent problem, this occurs when an employee (the agent) can hide information
from his employer (the principal). Technically, this is referred to as hidden action or moral
hazard. The problem arises because there is some uncertainty between the agents e¤ort
and the outcomes that the principal observes. The importance of this is that the principal
cannot be certain that the agent is shirking (not working as hard as he could) by simply
observing outcomes. A hard worker could have a bad outcome due to bad luck, or a lazy
worker could have a good outcome due to good luck. There is a long standing and mature
theoretical literature dealing with the principal-agent problem (Mirrlees (1975), Grossman
and Hart (1983)). In the basic model, the principal has to o¤er the agent a contract that will
motivate his participation and e¤ort. If both the principal and agent are risk neutral; the
solution in the case where the principal does want the agent to exert high e¤ort is a 100%
commission contract with a xed payment from the agent to the principal. We can think
of a wholesaler selling to a retailer as opposed to taking a percentage once the item sells to
the end user. The solution changes when the agent is risk averse. A risk averse agent is not
willing to pay in full for the product because he does not like the uncertainty that he faces
when he tries to resell the item. In this case, the principal has to pay some at wage to bear
some of the risk (this can be thought of as insurance for the agent. He knows he will get
something for his e¤orts even if he does not make the sale).
An alternative to the principal insuring the agent is for the principal to monitor the
agent. If it costs less for the principal to monitor the agent than it does for him to insure
his wage, monitoring will be preferred. It will also be important to consider the cost of
monitoring versus the amount of money being lost to employee shirking. Recent empirical
work has tried to capture how much rms may be losing due to their employees being
rational cheaters. Nagin (2002) denes a rational cheater as someone who will shirk when
the marginal benet of doing so exceeds the marginal cost. A rational cheater will exert
low e¤ort on the job if he thinks he can get away with it. Some reports estimate that
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shirking workers cost employers billions of dollars in productivity losses yearly7. Employers
(principals) who are aware of the nancial incentives they are giving employees (agents) may
introduce a monitoring system with performance goals to alleviate the perceived problem.
These issues with worker motivation are di¢ cult and complex. Consider a recent New York
City court case:
On March 9, 2006, John B. Sooner, a New York City administrative law judge,
recommended that Toquir Choudhri, a 14-year veteran of the city Department
of Education, receive only a reprimand for disobedience, even though supervisors
wanted him red for using the Internet for personal matters8. Spooner wrote
that Choudhri credibly stated that he completed all assignments given to him
by his boss and used the internet while he awaited further assignments. These
statements were corroborated by the absence of proof that Choudhri was ever
criticized for poor productivity or for not completing specic assignments.9 The
New York City Chancellor of Education, Joel Klein, decided to re Choudhri
anyway. Klein stated that the penalty of termination is appropriate and not
shocking to ones sense of fairness, .... Choudhris abuse of the Internet at the
time he is supposed to be performing his job demonstrates his disinterest in the
job.10
The worker in the above case was red for shirking on the job when his employer found
him surng the internet. The worker did not think he deserved to be red because he had
completed all of his assignments. The worker thought he was being monitored in regard to
fulllment of some quota, and he had fullled his quota, but the employer disagreed. This
case demonstrates the problems caused when the monitoring system is not well delineated,
7Frauenheim, Ed. "Stop Reading This Headline and Get Back to Work." CNET, Monday, July 11, 2005,
http://news.com.com/Stop+reading+this+headline+and+get+back+to+work/2100-1022_3-5783552.html
8Klopott, Freeman. "Should You Be Fired for Using the Internet While at Work?" PC World, Tuesday,
May 02, 2006, http://pcworld.com/article/id,125597-page,1/article.html?RSS=RSS
9Department of Education v. Choudhri, New York City O¢ ce of Administrative Trials and Hearings,
No. 722/06 (3/9/06)
10Associated Press. "NYC Fires Man For Web Surng At Work." CBS News,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/05/06/tech/main1596034.shtml
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but it also shows how concerned some employers are about any behavior consistent with
shirking.
Past experimental research (Cadsby et al. (2004), Dickinson and Villeval (2005)) has
shown that some workers in a laboratory setting work without incentives. This shares some
similarities with Akerlofs (1982) proposition of a gift-exchange where an employee may
choose to exert high e¤ort because he is grateful for the highwage that the principal is
paying him. This phenomenon has been broadly studied in terms of its reciprocity and trust
aspects (Fehr et al. (1993), and Berg et al. (1995)). With a more narrow focus, Fehr et
al. (1998) use experiments to model the gift-exchange in terms of a fair-wage,and nd
support for the idea that high wages can lead to e¢ ciency gains and better outcomes for
both the employer and employee. There are some critics to this work. I can best frame
the criticisms in terms of how the past gift exchange experiments do not follow the precepts
for a valid experiment. Taken on their face value, the gift-exchange experiments reject
traditional agency theory. This falls under the framework of using experiments to speak to
theorists. But Engelmann and Ortmann (2002) show that the earlier work did not meet the
necessary requirement of giving the theory its best chance for success. Recall the underlying
thinking, theories that fail in the laboratory when given their best chance for success are
highly unlikely to be validated in a natural setting. It is not the case that theories given a
poor chance at success can be invalidated. Engelmann and Ortmann change some features
of the past experiments and nd that traditional theory performs well. Charness, Frechette
and Kagel (2001) show that the past experimental failure of agency theory captured by
the gift-exchange experiments could be caused by something as simple as the subjects not
realizing the incentives of the game. By providing their subjects with a comprehensive payo¤
table, the gift-exchange nding is severely lowered and traditional theory performs well. So,
even when the theory is not given its best shot in terms of design, simply clarifying the
instructions is enough for traditional theory to survive.
It is important to investigate if Cadsby et al. (2004), and Dickinson and Villeval (2005)
laboratory results indicate behaviors we would see in a real work setting, or if the possibility
exists that these observations are an artifact of the experimental design. Cadsby et al.
(2004), and Dickinson and Villeval (2005) were not specically looking at e¤ort with low
incentives, so there is remaining value to their research even if the observations of subjects
18
working without incentives are an artifact of their design. Below I will further discuss the
aspects of their work that show e¤ort when their subjects are not motivated. But I note here
that Cadsby et al. are interested in how people self select into various payment schemes;
Dickinson and Villeval are concerned with testing competing theories related to the principal-
agent problem. They test if monitoring leads to increased e¤ort or if announcing a monitor
system informs subjects that they are expected to be shirking. Even if there results are
biased towards high e¤ort, they can still gain insight into their primary question.
A common approach used in the laboratory to investigate the principal-agent problem
is to give subjects a cost function and have them choose some e¤ort level. Nalbantian and
Schotter (1997), for example presents an experiment in which a subject is monitored with
probability. If the subject is not expending a certain level of e¤ort, he will be terminated.
The e¤ortin this case is not physical exertion but rather a gurative e¤ort. This number
they pick is indeed interpreted as e¤ort and therefore has the property that e¤ort is now
explicit. While this matches clearly with their models, it is not clear that subjects perceive
this choice as analogous to physical or mental exertion. The (e) chosen by the subject is
costly to the subject but it is possible that this is too abstract to model real work.11 Putting
the workers through a real e¤ort experiment will allow an answer as to whether simply
choosing e¤ort garners the same behavior as exerting e¤ort, and if it does not, one can be
condent that the real e¤ort experiment is a better proxy for the workplace. The approach
of using real e¤ort tasks to investigate workplace behavior is becoming more popular (see:
Dickinson, (1999); Sillamaa, (1999); van Dijk, Sonnemans and van Winden, (2001); Gneezy,
Niederle and Rustichini, (2003); Dickenson and Villeval (2005); Montmarquette, Rulliere,
Villeval and Zeiliger, (2004); Falk and Ichino, (2006)).
While an agents outside option can be represented rather easily in a theoretical
framework, it is not so trivial to do in a laboratory. To think of this one must place himself
in the position of the subject in the experiment. The subject arrives at the laboratory and is
assigned a computer terminal. He is given the option of engaging some task and earning X
or he can take the outside option (sit still) and earn Y. If the disparity between the outside
option and the participation option is not large, there exists the possibility that the subject
11Some pros of gurative e¤ort include control of subject ability, and ease of implementation in the
laboratory.
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will engage the game to avoid boredom.
The aforementioned research by Cadsby et al. (2004), and Dickinson and Villeval (2005)
found that subjects contribute e¤ort even when they have no nancial reason to do so. The
idea of a moral imperative not to shirk is given as a reason for this behavior by Dickinson.
Cadsbys experiment gives subjects seven scrambled letters and the subjects are instructed
to make as many words as possible in a given time period. The subjects are allowed to
choose a piece rate or a at rate scheme, the piece rate will pay them per word, and the
at rate will give them some stated amount with no requirement on word creation. These
incentives should lead subjects who think they are endowed with word creation ability and
low e¤ort cost to choose the piece rate scheme and the subjects who have high e¤ort cost or
are not good at word creation to choose the at rate scheme. The interesting observation
is that there are signicantly more than zero words created by the subjects who choose the
at rate scheme. This is contrary to the incentive structure, and one would not believe the
subjects feel a moral imperative to unscramble letters. Dickinson and Villeval (2005) use
a real e¤ort task and they observe that some of the subjects (25%) contribute at or above
the desired output level even when monitoring is set to zero. Dickinson, as noted earlier,
suggests this as either intrinsic motivation or integrity and commitment to moral principles.
It is possible that subjects feel a moral imperative because they are interacting with a human
principal, but that is not the case in Cadsby (2004). The intrinsic motivation argument is
plausible in both experiments. The subjects might enjoy unscrambling letters, and they
might enjoy moving along a curve to get a high value, but it is not clear that observations
made under these conditions should be interpreted as analogous to intrinsic motivation one
might experience in the real world. In both experiments, the subjects could engage in e¤ort,
or do nothing. It is possible that they were engaging the tasks because they were bored.
This is similar to Choudris claim that he browsed the internet only because he had no other
work to do. If the subjects in the experiment do not engage the task, they have nothing else
to do.
Other experiments have shown that outside options have important e¤ects. Lei, Plott,
and Noussair (2001) show that excess trading in an asset market can be reduced by giving
subjects something to do beyond trading in the asset market. Pevnitskaya and Palfrey (2004)
show that over-entry into an auction can be reduced by allowing subjects an outside option of
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a computerized version of rock-paper-scissors. Van Dijk et al. (2001) conduct an experiment
where subjects are enabled to work on two tasks in the same period. The earnings from
one task go in to a group account while the earnings from the other task go in to a private
account, similar to a public goods game. This alleviates the e¤ort only due to boredom
problem that is plausible in the Cadsby(2004) and Dickinson (2004) papers. The specic
task the paper uses has the subjects search a grid looking for the highest payo¤. The idea
of having two of these for the subjects to play cures the boredom critique.
2.5 Going Forward
I began this literature review by describing reasons for using experimental economics and
methods for conducting a valid economic experiment. The following two chapters will use
the methods outlined and show results that speak to theorists, search for facts, and could be
used to whisper in the ears of princes.
For my experiments, the reward medium is money. All subjects are paid a $10 show
up fee, but this is not enough to ensure that they are su¢ ciently motivated. To meet the
saliency requirement, the subjectsactions in the experiment must be tied to the reward
medium. So, subjects have a salient reward to attend the experiment, but they also have
salient rewards in the experiment.
In Chapter 3, I will report the results of an experiment where I have the same subjects
participate in two institutions. I use the FPSB auction and the Holt-Laury lottery discussed
above. I do this to see if subjects have consistent risk preferences between these institutions.
By using these specic institutions, I can evaluate risk preferences without assuming an
underlying utility function. I am also able to evaluate how well the CRRA model does in
measuring risk preferences across these institutions. So, the rst result is a search for facts,
and the second is speaking to theory.
In Chapter 4, I examine individual behavior in an environment designed to mimic work
for an employer. This chapter develops a theory that is a derivative of the basic principal
agent model, specic to the situation that I am modelling. I then test this theory in an
economic experiment. The success of the theory test gives insight into how managers may
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want to motivate their employees. So, this chapter speaks to theorists and could be used to
inform policy. Further, it is my intention that this chapter also speaks to experimentalists by
addressing a methodological issue. I examine if specic features of past experimental designs
were responsible for inuencing behavior in a way that past experiments did not take into
account.
2.6 Conclusion
I have used the experimental economics methodology laid out by Smith (1982) to investigate
how individuals respond to uncertainty in various settings. Recall that Roth pointed out
three specic uses for experimental economics. I will summarize my results by discussing
how they t into Roths framework, and give some nal remarks.
First I will discuss how my dissertation speaks to theorists, and searches for facts. I am
combining these two uses because my risk preferences experiment addresses both. The basic
question regarding consistency of risk preferences can be thought of as a search for facts,
but it is heavily intertwined with economic theory. It was not my intention that my results
would make a strong case for economic theory, but it has turned out that way. In examining
risk preferences across institutions I have found that individuals behave quite consistently.
I was able to use two devices that allow for non parametric results to show that individuals
who are observed to be risk averse in a rst-price-sealed-bid (FPSB) auction are likely to be
risk averse in a Holt-Laury (HL) lottery. I consider this as a factual result that can inform
theory. This is the concept Roth described when speaking about a search for facts. This is
a nice result for economic theory because it allows for the individuals to be modelled more
generally than if their characteristics changed due to the institution. I have not however
closed the question that was raised by Isaac and James (2000) that subjects bid as if
risk neutral/risk loving in the BDM device. But the fact that my results are supportive of
traditional economic theory suggests that focus should be placed on examining what is going
on in the BDM. As for speaking to a specic theory, my results were supportive of the CRRA
model that was put forth by Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982). I found a strong relationship
between risk parameters backed out of the FPSB auction and those backed out in the HL
lottery.
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In my monitoring experiment, I found that subjects respond similarly to what my model
predicts, and since my model is derivative of basic principal-agent theory for my specic
institution, economic theory again performs quite well.
My monitoring experiment also whispers in the ears of princes, if one is bold enough to
equate employers with princes. The main point of this concept is that economic experiments
can be used to inform policy. My experiment suggests that managers should, in fact, monitor
their employees if they are giving them incentives that induce shirking. However, my results
would inform managers that they should be wary of requiring full out e¤ort all of the time,
as my results showed that subjects became much more likely to shirk when their task became
increasingly taxing. The danger with this for managers is that by requiring too much, they
may actually get less than if they required a more modest output.
The last result that I would like to discuss could be termed speaking to experimentalists.
My monitoring experiment shows that when individuals are given an incentive to shirk,
they do. This is consistent with economic theory, but at odds with some past real e¤ort
experimental results (Cadsby(2004) and Dickinson and Villeval (2005)). Since the past
papers were not focusing on this issue, some briey claimed that this could be due to subjects
maximizing a utility function that has parameters theorists may not generally model. This
could, in fact, be true, but I would claim that it should not be the rst response. I believe
the rst response should be a self critical examination of the experimental design. It is my
contention that what was dubbed as a moral imperative to not shirk could simply be a loss
of control in the experiment. If subjects enjoy participating in the experiment as opposed to
sitting still, the experimental design should take pains to ensure that costlyparticipation
overrides the cost of sitting still.
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CHAPTER 3
First Price Auctions, Lotteries, and Risk Preferences
Across Institutions
3.1 Introduction
Recent experimental research has called into question the assumption that individuals who
are risk averse in one institution will be risk averse in another institution. If these ndings
are robust, and individualsrisk preferences in one situation have no bearing on how they
act in other situations, economists will face a di¢ cult task in trying to model behavior where
individuals face uncertainty. If, however, there are possibly classes of institutions, or specic
features of institutions that lead to predictable behavior, the situation is much less dire.
Much of the experimental economics risk preference analysis can be traced back to
Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982), and Cox, Smith and Walker (CSW) (1988). In studying
rst price auctions, subjects were commonly observed to bid above the risk neutral Nash
equilibrium prediction. A plausible explanation is that the subjects are risk averse (Milgrom
and Weber (1982)). By bidding higher, a subject increases the probability that he will
win the auction, albeit at a higher price. CSW further showed that they could back out a
subjects risk parameter given his bid.
Harrison (1990) put forth a challenge to the risk parameters derived by CSW. Using the
BDM mechanism (Becker, Degroot, Marschak (1964))1 and the same model as CSW, he
1The BDM works as follows: a subject is endowed with a lottery, and asked his min price of selling this
lottery back to the experimenter. The experimenter then draws a random number. If the number drawn is
greater than the selling price, the lottery is sold and the subject receives the value of the random number. If
the random number is lower than the min selling price, the subject plays the lottery and earns the proceeds.
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found that his subjectsbehavior was more risk loving than the behavior of CSWs subjects.
It is possible that the risk parameter derived in Harrison (1990) is di¤erent than that derived
by CSW simply due to having di¤erent subjects. Isaac and James (2000) explore this by
having the same subjects participate in both institutions. On aggregate, they nd that their
subjects act similarly, in the rst price auction, to the subjects in CSW, and that their
subjects act similarly, in the BDM, to the subjects in Harrison (1990). Isaac and James
(2000) calculate the risk parameter for each individual subject in both institutions, further
they rank the subjects in each institution (from most to least risk averse). Their results show
that neither values nor ranks are preserved across institutions. This raises a few questions.
Do subjects truly have unstable parameters, or is something else at play? Do either of these
devices measure risk aversion? Is the technique used to back out the risk parameter valid, is
it valid for one institution and not the other?
The model used by CSW and followed by Harrison (1990) and Isaac and James (2000)
assumes that individuals have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). Kagel et al. (1987)
and Smith and Walker (1993), in contradiction to this, show that as the expected payo¤ of
winning the auction increases subjectsbids increase by more than the CRRA model would
predict. Subject behavior in these studies is consistent with risk aversion, but it is increasing
relative risk aversion not CRRA.2 Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2000) explore alternatives
explanations of overbidding by trying to estimate parameters with various models. They
nd that the risk aversion model is the best t.
There is strong evidence that subjects in rst price auctions behave, at the least, as if
risk averse, and it is possible to measure this behavior without assuming either constant
relative or increasing relative risk aversion. Holt and Laury (2002) introduce a new lottery
device that also allows for elicitation of risk preferences. Similar to Kagel et al. and Smith and
Walker, they nd that subjects risk aversion increases as potential earnings increase. A nice
feature of the Holt-Laury lottery is that while it can be used to get an estimate of subjects
risk parameters under various assumptions of subjectsutility functions, it also allows for
some proxy of risk aversion without assuming an underlying model. In my experiment, I
have the same subjects participate in the rst price auction and a the Holt-Laury lottery. By
2For a detailed account of this debate see Kagel (1995).
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using these institutions I can evaluate risk preferences without assuming an underlying utility
function. I am also able to evaluate how well the CRRA does in measuring risk preferences
across these institutions. I nd that subjects behave consistently across institutions. I also
nd that the CRRA estimates in the rst price auction are correlated with CRRA estimates
derived from the lottery.
3.2 Experimental Design
The experiment conducted for this paper was designed to elicit subjects risk parameters
in two institutions. The rst institution the subjects participate in is a Holt-Laury lottery
using the protocol established by Prasad and Salmon (2007). The second institution that
the subjects participate in is an independent private values, rst-price, sealed bid auction.
All subjects participated in the lottery prior to participating in the auction. Economists are
often concerned about order e¤ects in experiments. The main concern with ordering is that
participation in the rst experiment will inuence behavior in the subsequent experiment.
This is a valid concern when the institutions are closely related (e.g. the ultimatum game
and the dictator game, rst price auctions and second price auctions) but that is not an issue
here, the experiments in this paper do not share common elements. There is also a concern
about wealth e¤ects (how money earned in one experiment may a¤ect behavior in another).
That is also not warranted for this study because money earned in the lottery does not carry
over into the auction.
3.2.1 First Price Auction
In this portion of the experiment the subjects participate in 30 rounds of rst price auctions.
Each auction lasts 30 seconds, and there are 30 seconds between each auction. The subjects
were randomly placed into groups of four. The subjects do not know who the other members
of their group are, but they do know that the group consists of the same four members for
all 30 rounds.
In each round the subjects draw a number from the uniform distribution [0, 100].
This number is their value for the hypothetical object being auctioned o¤. The subjects
26
are informed that their value along with all members values are drawn from a uniform
distribution. The subjects are told in the experiment instruction that it is highly likely
that all the members in your group all have di¤erent values.
To earn money in this portion of the experiment, a subject must win the auction. The
subject who wins the auction receives the di¤erence between his value and the amount he
bid for the item. The winner of the auction is revealed at the end of each of the 30 auctions.
3.2.2 Holt-Laury Lottery
In the Holt-Laury lottery institution, a subject is given a menu of lottery pairs (Table 3.1).
The subject is to choose either Option A or Option B for each pair of lotteries. The fourth
column in Table 3.1 shows the expected payo¤ di¤erence of choosing Option A over Option
B.3 A risk neutral subject will choose Option A until decision ve where the expected payo¤
of selecting Option A becomes negative, and from this point on would only select Option B.
A risk loving subject would switch earlier, and a risk averse subject would delay switching
until some time after decision 5.
Prasad and Salmon computerizes the Holt-Laury device using z-Tree (Fischbacher(1999)).
With this protocol subjects saw each choice individually in a sequential order. The subjects,
under this protocol, were not allowed to change their decisions once they had been made.
Salmon and Prasad claim that this is not a problem for their purposes as it allows for
some gauge of the subjectssophistication. They later use this gauge to analyze behavior
in another situation. The claim is that, with their method, it is not as transparent to a
subject that he should only have one switching point. The argument is that sophisticated
subjects will be able to pick up the underlying incentives of the lottery and only make one
switch. Subjects who make many switches may not be paying close attention to the details
of the experiment, and knowing this may allow insight into erratic behavior elsewhere. In the
event that subjects do have more than one switching point, the decision where they choose
Option B and never subsequently choose Option A will be viewed as indicative of their risk
preference and in this paper will be referred to as a subjects last switch. After the subjects
3The fourth column (di¤erence in expected value) is not shown to the subjects.
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make all ten decisions, one of the ten chosen lotteries is randomly selected and played for
actual earnings.
The lottery and auction experiments were conducted over four sessions and 32 subjects
participated. The subjects for the experiment were undergraduates at Florida State
University. The experiment was computer based and conducted with z-Tree software. When
the subjects arrived they were assigned to computer terminals. The instructions for the
experiment (see Appendix) were read aloud and the subjects had a chance to ask questions.
The subjects were paid a $10.00 show up fee, and were able to earn money based on their
performance in the experiment. The average earnings per subject for the experiment were
$25.00.
3.3 Theory and Hypotheses
3.3.1 Deriving Risk Parameters Using a First Price Auction.
By assuming that bidders in an independent private values, rst-price, sealed bid auction
are risk neutral and that their values (v) are randomly drawn from the uniform distribution
[v; v], Vickrey (1961) showed that the optimal bid function bi (vi) for a risk neutral bidder
in an auction with n bidders is:
bi (vi) = v +
n  1
n
(vi   v) (3.1)
Which can be estimated as:
bi (vi) = i + vi + "i (3.2)
Milgrom and Weber show that individuals who are risk averse will bid above the optimal
bid of a risk neutral bidder. The idea is that people participate in an auction to increase
their well being, and they do so by gaining some object at a price lower than the value they
place on that object. So, their surplus is their value minus their bid (if they win). Low bids
increase this surplus, but they lower the likelihood of winning. whereas bids closer to the
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value of the object decrease the surplus but increase the likelihood of winning. A person who
is risk averse will bid higher than a risk neutral person because the risk lies in not capturing
the surplus. It follows that the most risk averse person will bid closest to their value, and the
least risk averse will bid well below their value. Thus, the estimate of  in Equation 3.2 will
be correlated with risk aversion (subjects who are more risk averse will have higher s: This
gives me a non-parametric measure of risk aversion. Cox Roberson and Smith, and Cox,
Smith and Walker construct a parametric measure for risk aversion. They observed that
subjects do, in fact, typically bid above bi. They subsequently developed what is known as
the constant relative risk aversion model (CRRAM) for rst price, private value, single unit
auctions. The CRRAM assumes that bidders have heterogeneous risk preferences and that
all bidders are aware of this. They model this set of beliefs with equation 3.4 which is similar
to equation 3.1 with a slight modication to include a risk parameter ri. We can see that a
more risk averse person (r closer to 0) will bid higher than someone who is less risk averse.
Cox, Roberson and Smith show the best response to this belief is to respond with the same
bid function so long as bi < b. Beyond this point they cannot solve for a closed form linear
solution. To see why, we can consider a simple example. Assume you are a bidder in a two
bidder auction, you are risk averse (with r = 0:5), and assume that you believe your rival to
be risk neutral (r = 1). If you value the object such that v = 100 (let v = 100; and v = 0),
and bid according to equation 3.4, you would bid 66:67. However, this would not be a best
response. You know that the most your risk neutral rival would bid is 50: If you believed
that your rival was slightly risk averse (r = 0:8), then the most he would bid is 55.56. In
either of these cases, you would want to bid less than 66:67: So, you do not best respond to
them by choosing bi where bi > b: In order to apply this to experiment data Cox, Smith and
Walker introduce a method, followed by Isaac and James, to censor their data by eliminating
observations where the induced value is above
 
n 1
n
v

:4 This forces bi < b. The optimal bid
function with the CRRAM assumptions in equation 3.4 also allows for the linear estimation
shown in equation 3.2.
b = v +
n  1
n
(v   v) (3.3)
4For my experiment, I will truncate the data by eliminating induced values greater than 75. This is
because I have four subjects and the highest induced value is 100
 
n 1
n v = 75

:
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bi (vi) = v +
n  1
n  1 + ri (vi   v) (3.4)
If bidders bid according to the Nash equilibrium, then  = 0 and we combine equations
3.4 and 3.2, we nd :
v + n 1
n 1+ri (vi   v)
vi
=  (3.5)
Using v = 0, as I will for the experiment, equation 3.5 allows us to solve for ri.
ri =
(1  i) (n  1)
i
(3.6)
3.3.2 Deriving Risk Parameters Using the H-L Mechanism
I will use two measures of risk aversion. As noted in Section 2.2, where a subject makes
his last switch among the ten decisions in Table 3.1 is indicative of his risk preference.
Subjects who have a high last switch are more risk averse than subjects who have a low
last switch. I will use this method because it does not require any underlying assumptions
to be made about the subjectsutility function. As a secondary measure, I will derive a
range of risk parameters for individual subjects using the CRRA model. This will allow for
direct comparison of the CRRAM result in the auction. If we assume that subjects possess
constant relative risk aversion utility, their preferences can be represented by the following
functional form5:
U(x) = xr (3.7)
The switching point in the Holt-Laury mechanism allows derivation of the bounds in
which a subjects risk parameter must be located. Assume that a subject facing Decision 6
in Table 3.1 chooses Option B for the rst time and continues to choose Option B thereafter.
This means that for Decision 5 he views:
5Holt and Laury used the utility function U(x) = x
1 r
1 r , their bounds will look di¤erent but have similar
properties. This was done to allow direct comparison to Cox, Smith and Walker (1988) and Isaac and James
(2000).
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Table 3.1: Lottery Choices and expected payo¤di¤erential of choosing Lottery A over Lottery
B
Decision Option A Option B Expected Payo¤Di¤erence
1 1=10 of $2:00, 9=10 of $1:60 1=10 of $3:85, 9=10 of $0:10 $1:17
2 2=10 of $2:00, 8=10 of $1:60 2=10 of $3:85, 8=10 of $0:10 $0:83
3 3=10 of $2:00, 7=10 of $1:60 3=10 of $3:85, 7=10 of $0:10 $0:50
4 4=10 of $2:00, 6=10 of $1:60 4=10 of $3:85, 6=10 of $0:10 $0:16
5 5=10 of $2:00, 5=10 of $1:60 5=10 of $3:85, 5=10 of $0:10  $0:18
6 6=10 of $2:00, 4=10 of $1:60 6=10 of $3:85, 4=10 of $0:10  $0:51
7 7=10 of $2:00, 3=10 of $1:60 7=10 of $3:85, 3=10 of $0:10  $0:85
8 8=10 of $2:00, 2=10 of $1:60 8=10 of $3:85, 2=10 of $0:10  $1:18
9 9=10 of $2:00, 1=10 of $1:60 9=10 of $3:85, 1=10 of $0:10  $1:52
10 10=10 of $2:00, 0=10 of $1:60 10=10 of $3:85, 0=10 of $0:10  $1:85
EU(A) = 0:5($2:00)r + 0:5 ($1:60)r > 0:5($3:85)r + 0:5 ($0:10)r = EU (B) (3.8)
and for Decision 6 he views:
EU (B) = 0:6($3:85)r + 0:4 ($0:10)r > 0:6($2:00)r + 0:4 ($1:60)r = EU(A) (3.9)
Solving equation 3.8 and 3.9 shows that a subject who has the utility function in equation
3.7 has a risk parameter that falls in the range 0:59 < r < 0:85: Table 3.2 lists the risk
parameters for possible switches.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: The aggregated mean CRRAM risk parameter from the rst price auction
and the mean last switch in the Holt Laury lottery risk parameter are consistent with past
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Table 3.2: Risk parameter derived from last switch
Last Switch
Range Of
Relative Risk Aversion
for U(x) = xr
Risk Preference
Classication
1  2 r > 1:95 highly risk loving
3 1:49 < r < 1:95 very risk loving
4 1:15 < r < 1:49 risk loving
5 0:85 < r < 1:15 risk neutral
6 0:59 < r < 0:85 slightly risk averse
7 0:32 < r < 0:59 risk averse
8 0:03 < r < 0:32 very risk averse
9  0:37 < r < 0:03 highly risk averse
10 r <  0:37 stay in bed
subject pools, and the mean CRRAM risk parameter in the auction falls within the CRRAM
range of the risk parameters derived from the lottery.
Recall that Harrison showed that his subject pools risk estimate was di¤erent than the
risk estimate obtained by Cox, Smith and Walker. Isaac and James had the same subject
pool participate in two di¤erent institutions and found that the risk parameter estimates
were not consistent
In my experiment, I have observations for the same subject pool in di¤erent institutions.
I can also compare my results in the auction to the past results of Cox, Smith and Walker,
and Isaac and James, and my results in the lottery to those of Holt and Laury and Prasad and
Salmon to see how my subjectsbehavior in each institution compares with other subjects in
similar institutions. By validating that my subjects behave similarly to past subjects, I can
be condent that any further ndings in this study are not special to my subject pool. If my
subjects as a group behave consistently across institutions, it becomes worthwhile to study
them at the individual level. If there was a preference reversal in the mean, the possibility
for consistency at the individual level would be eliminated.
Hypothesis 2: The ranking of subjects by their risk tolerance (both  and r in the
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auction and last switch and r in the lottery) is consistent across the auction and the lottery.
If subjects are found to have di¤erent risk parameter values in di¤erent institutions, it
could be the case that there is simply a shift and the subjects would maintain their relative
ranking i.e. subject A would be more risk averse than subject B in both institutions. If
subjects at least maintain their ranking, we can be condent that the modelling techniques
are capturing something salient about the subjects. It could be the case that for some
reason context makes the subjects more risk averse in one institution than the other. This
would still be troubling when trying to speak generally about behavior, but it would be less
troubling than subjectsranks varying wildly between institutions. If subjectsranks are not
consistent we would have to gure out what kind of semantic game we are playing with the
word risk.
Hypothesis 3: Individual subjects exhibit the same level of risk tolerance in di¤erent
institutions. Subjects  should be correlated with last switch and under the CRRAM
assumptions, a subjects risk parameter in the auction should fall in the corresponding range
of risk parameters derived in the lottery.
The point of developing economic models is to be able to predict how people will behave.
If an individual has certain tendencies when making a decision that entails uncertainty, it
should be the case that these tendencies are similar regardless of the institution. We can
think of it this way, suppose a person does not like peanuts. I can then predict that he will
never willingly eat peanuts, and I will feel very condent in my prediction. But, what if this
person only dislikes peanuts sometimes? My attempts at predicting his behavior becomes
more taxing. I have to start worrying about context, maybe he likes peanuts when he is at a
baseball game, but he does not like peanuts when he is watching baseball at home. This is a
more di¢ cult situation to model. Imagine I had to forecast demand for peanuts. If everyone
had consistent peanut preferences, my job is not that hard. But if demand for peanuts
changes with context, forecasting is much harder. Now I have to approximate baseball
attendance. I can still do a forecast, but I will be much less condent in my prediction. If
we think about risk aversion, we can view it as someone not liking risk. As an economist, I
will feel much more comfortable about my predictions if people do not like risk by the same
amount whether or not they are at a baseball game.
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3.4 Results
Result 1 : Subjects (as a group) in the rst price auction behave consistently with the
subjects in Cox, Smith and Walker. Subjects in the Holt-Laury lottery behave consistently
with the subjects in Holt and Laury and Prasad and Salmon. In the current study, the mean
risk parameter in the auction, calculated with the CRRA model, falls within the range that
these same subjects exhibited in the lottery.
In this section I will show that my subjects behaved as other subjects did in the same
institution. By replicating the past experiments, we can diminish any critique that further
results are determined by a subject pool e¤ect. Table 3.3 shows the last switch observed for
subjects using the H-L mechanism in my experiment and two past experiments. Holt and
Laury report the mean last switch in their experiment is 6:2 which implies risk aversion,
and a CRRAM risk parameter in the range 0:59 < r < 0:85. Prasad and Salmon report
that the mean last switch in their experiment is 7:06 which implies a risk parameter in
the range 0:32 < r < 0:59. I nd that the mean last switch in my experiment is 6:86; 6
which implies a risk parameter in the range 0:32 < r < 0:59. The reported last switches for
all three experiments are not statistically di¤erent (p   value = 0:63 for comparison with
P-S, p   value = 0:11 for comparison with H-L). Subjects in my experiment are behaving
consistently with subjects in prior experiments.
Table 3.4 shows the mean implied risk parameters of subjects participating in a rst-price,
sealed bid auction. I nd a mean estimate of r = 0:37 which is between the parameters found
by Cox, Smith and Walker and Isaac and James. CSW nd a mean estimate of r = 0:35,
I-J nd a mean estimate of r = 0:50. All of these estimates imply risk aversion. My
results are not statistically di¤erent than CSW (p   value = 0:6624). However, my results
are statistically di¤erent than I-J (p   value = 0:0162) :7 The key aspect of risk preference
is not changed, just the level. This could easily be due to my subject pool being slightly
di¤erent than I-J. It should be pointed out that my experiment and CSW had four human
6Only subjects that conform to the Nash equilibrium linear bid function, (  = 0) in the rst price
auction, are used for comparison. The mean last switch point for all subjects that is 7.03. This result is not
statistically di¤erent than 6.86 (p   value = 0:683).
7I-J state that their results are not statistically di¤erent from CSW. CSW have a smaller subject pool
than I do, and therefore a larger condence interval. I-Js estimate falls within CSWs interval, but not mine.
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Table 3.3: Mean last switch in lottery with di¤erent subject pools
Lottery H-L P-S E
Last Switch 6:2 7:06 6:86
Derived risk parameter 0:59 < r < 0:85 0:32 < r < 0:59 0:32 < r < 0:59
Table 3.4: Mean risk parameter in auction with di¤erent subject pools
Auction CSW I-J E
Risk Parameter (r) 0.35 0.50 0.37
Table 3.5: Mean risk parameter in auction and lottery with the same subject pool
Auction Lottery
Risk Parameter (r) 0.37 0.32-0.59
subjects bidding against each other, where I-J had one human bidding against four risk
neutral robots, though Walker, Smith and Cox (1987) found no signicant di¤erence in how
subjects behave when bidding against robots instead of humans.
Table 3.5 shows that the implied risk parameter for the group in the auction falls within
the range of the implied risk parameter for the group in the lottery. This does not yet prove
that subjects at the individual level behave the same way in each institution, but allows for
the possibility. There would be no need to run individual subject level tests if the result had
been the opposite, and we could be condent that subjects do not behave the same way in
di¤erent institutions.
Result 2: The ranking of subjects from most to least risk averse is consistent across
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institutions.
The rst way I have chosen to test cross task consistency is to rank subjects in each
institution and examine if these rankings are consistent across institutions. I do not need
to assume an underlying model to do this because subjects can be ranked based on their 
and their last switch. After ranking the subjects from most risk averse (high values of ) to
least risk averse (low values of ) a Spearman test was conducted to test rank preservation.
I nd that there is a positive correlation, ( = 0:35) but it is not signicant at the 10%
level (it is signicant at the 11% level). So we do see a positive correlation in ranks, but
the signicance is tenuous. This lack of signicance could be due to the way subjectsranks
are determined in the auction versus how they are ranked in the lottery. Recall that in the
auction, there is an explicit estimate of : In the lottery, subjectsranks are determined by
where they switch to Option B. The lottery does not give a point estimate for risk aversion.
This could possibly create a problem because tiny di¤erences in the auction could lead to a
large di¤erence of where a subject ranks in the auction, but subjects who last switch at 7
cannot be ranked within that bin. It is easier to think about this in terms of the CRRAM.
With the CRRAM we can derive point estimates in the auction, but only bins over a range
of risk parameters in the lottery. For example, subjects 1,2, and 19 in the lottery switch to
Option B at decision 7 which places their risk parameter in the range 0:32 < r < 0:59. In the
auction, the subjects have r = 0:42, 0:58, and 0:36 (respectively). This means that subjects
1,2, and 9s estimates from the auction fall within the range found in the lottery. But, when
these subjects are ranked, the lottery ranks them all at 11 (since they are tied), while the
auction ranks them at 15, 19, and 12. I have taken subjectsrisk parameter estimates from
the auction and put them into the same range that the estimates from the lottery fall (Table
3.6). What I am forcing here is not that ranks across institutions be similar, but that ties
in one institution are considered ties in the other institution. Figure 3.1 shows a scatterplot
of both the actual rankings and the hypothetical rankings from the auction on the rankings
from the lottery. Using these created last switch estimates, I have re-estimated Spearmans
 and nd a much stronger correlation ( = 0:59) with signicance at the 5% level.
Result 3: Individual subjects behave consistently across di¤erent institutions. Subjects
risk aversion measured by both their ; and their CRRAM parameter (r) in the rst price
auction is consistent with subjectsrisk aversion measured by their last switch in the lottery.
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Table 3.6: Subjects revised auction rankings. This places subjectsauction risk parameters
in bins consistent with those derived in the lottery.
Subject r (auction) r (lottery) Rank (auction) Rank (lottery) Rank (new)
1 0:42 0:32 < r < 0:59 15 11 16
2 0:58 0:32 < r < 0:59 19 11 16
19 0:36 0:32 < r < 0:59 12 11 16
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Figure 3.1: Within subject comparison between institutions (ranks): Actual rank is
represented by circles, Hypothetical by diamonds
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Further, the CRRAM parameter from the rst price auction is consistent with the CRRAM
parameters derived from the lottery.
We saw in Result 1 that my subjects behave as subjects in past experiments behaved. I
can now address the more important question of whether individuals behave similarly across
institutions. The rst test I will use is an Ordered Logit regression. This test is used because
the H-L Lottery does not allow for derivation of point estimates for a subjects risk preference.
The Ordered Logit allows for using the last switch levels directly as the dependent variable.
Table 3.7 reports the results of an Ordered Logit Regression where I have regressed the last
switch subjects made in the H-L Lottery on the coe¢ cient of a subjects value estimated by
their linear bid function in the rst price auction (). Table3.7 also reports the results of
the same test using the CRRAM derived risk parameter (r) instead of : I nd that there
is a signicant relationship between the two variables for both  and last switch, and r and
last switch. In other words, the more risk averse a subject is in the rst price auction, the
more likely it is that he would be more risk averse (have a high switching point) in the H-L
Lottery. Given the intercept (1 through 6)8 and the coe¢ cient, it is possible to construct
probabilities of making a specic last switch given some : For example, to calculate the
probability that an individual with  = 0:8 makes his last switch at decision 7:
e4 (0:8)
1 + e4 (0:8)
=
e15:482 16:433(0:8)
1 + e15:482 16:433(0:8)
= 0:912 (3.10)
Figure 3.2 shows the estimated probability of a subject having a particular Last Switch
given their estimated . For example, if a subject on average bids 80% of his value ( = 0:8)
there is a 91.2% chance that he made his last switch at decision 7 or lower, and more
specically, there is a 22% chance that he made his Last Switch exactly decision 7. In the
rst panel when  = 0:6 we can see that the probability is heavily skewed towards a subject
making their last switch early, while when  = 0:99 the probability is heavily skewed towards
of a subject making their last switch late. We can see similar results using the risk parameter
r in Figure 3.3. The data is limited to having a Last Switch lower bound of 4 because no
8In an orderd logit, there is an intercept for each section of the dependent variable. In this case, subjects
were observed to make a last switch as early as decision 4 or as late as decision 10. There are 6 intercepts.
There need not be an intercept for last switch 10, as the probability for any risk parameter being last switch
10 or lower is 1.
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Table 3.7: Ordered Logit Regression of the subjectslast switch in the lottery on the beta
coe¢ cient in the auction and the CRRAM risk parameter
Coef Std Err P>jzj Coef Std Err P>jzj
Beta Auction 16:433 8:224 0:046 Risk Auction  4:199 2:06 0:042
1 12:523 7:158 0:080 1  3:7285 1:18 0:001
2 13:493 7:220 0:062 2  2:738 1:028 0:008
3 13:956 7:248 0:054 3  2:27 0:983 0:021
4 15:482 7:393 0:037 4  0:742 0:866 0:391
5 16:322 7:460 0:029 5 0:0948 0:875 0:914
6 16:700 7:489 0:026 6 0:4692 0:905 0:605
subjects were observed to switch earlier than that.
The results of the Ordered Logit are consistent with an individual behaving similarly in
both institution. However, when we are examining the CRRAM model, the Ordered Logit
is only testing that the auction derived parameter is consistent with the dependent variable
last switch. So, a higher risk parameter was consistent with a lower last switch but it did
not test if the numerical value of the risk parameter fell within the range of numerical values
that can be backed out of the lottery. We can better evaluate the CRRAM results by looking
explicitly at each subjects derived parameter in both institutions. Table 3.4 shows subjects
derived risk parameters in both the lottery and the auction. There are 7 out of 22 subjects
(32%) whose risk parameter, derived from the auction, falls within the range of the risk
parameter derived in the lottery. Of the remaining 15 subjects, 10 are more risk averse in
the rst price auction than in the lottery institution. This means that 17 out of the 22 (77%)
are at least as risk averse in the lottery institution as they are in the rst price auction. It
is noteworthy that three of the subjects who were more risk averse in the lottery than the
auction did not switch to Option B in the lottery until the high payo¤ was assured. These
three subjects were quite risk averse in the auction (r = 0:11; 0:18; 0:44). This is of interest
because if a subject bids very close to their value (extremely risk averse) the lowest r that
can be estimated for them is 0. Whereas subjects who do not switch to Option B in the
lottery until it a sure thing will have an estimated risk parameter of r <  0:37: So it would
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Figure 3.2: Probablility of specic last switch for a given Beta
be impossible for a subject to be as risk averse in the auction as someone who made their
last switch at decision 10. If we look at Figure 3.4 (a plot of risk parameter ranges from the
lottery plotted on the risk parameter values derived from the auction) we can see that there
appears to be a strong positive correlation between the range from the lottery and the point
estimates from the auction.
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Figure 3.3: Probablility of specic last switch for a given risk parameter
Subject RP (HL) RP (FPA) HL-FPA Subject RP (HL) RP (FPA) HL-FPA
1 0:32 < r < 0:59 0:42 0 16 0:32 < r < 0:59 0:29 0:03
2 0:32 < r < 0:59 0:58 0 19 0:32 < r < 0:59 0:36 0
3 0:32 < r < 0:59 0:09 0:23 20 r <  0:37 0:18  0:55
4 1:15 < r < 1:49 0:45 0:70 21 0:85 < r < 1:15 0:06 0:79
5 0:32 < r < 0:59 0:30 :02 22 0:85 < r < 1:15 0:55 0:30
6 0:85 < r < 1:15 0:40 :45 24  0:37 < r < 0:03 0:22  0:19
9 0:32 < r < 0:59 0:67  0:08 26 0:03 < r < 0:33 0:26 0
10 0:32 < r < 0:59 0:19 0:13 28 0:03 < r < 0:33 0:30 0
12 0:59 < r < 0:85 0:39 0:20 29 0:03 < r < 0:33 0:30 0
13 r <  0:37 0:11  0:48 30 1:15 < r < 1:49 1:09 0:06
15 r <  0:37 0:44  0:81 31 0:59 < r < 0:85 0:59 0
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Table 3.8: Subject CRRAM risk parameter estimates in each institution
Correlation, however, is not enough to say that subjects behave the same way in each
institution. It could be the case that subject are always more risk averse in one institution
than the other. We have seen in Result 2 that subjects are ranked similarly in both
institutions, but that does not guarantee that the risk parameter for the subject is the
same in both institutions. To examine this, I rst have to see if there is, in fact, signicant
correlation. To do this, I have used subjects r estimates from the auction to see where
they would have last switched in the lottery from Option A to Option B (i.e. assume the
risk parameter from auction is true and then derive how a subject with that risk parameter
would act in the lottery). I call this the implicit last switch. We can see the result of this
in Table 3.9, and Figure 3.5 shows a scatterplot of the actual last switch on the implicit last
switch. With this sorting, I can now check for correlation between the actual last Switch and
the implicit last switch. I nd that these are positively correlated at the 5% level (Pearson
r = 0:56). With the assurance of this correlation, I can now examine the relationship between
the two institutions by regressing the actual last switch on the implicit last switch. Table
3.10 reports the results of this test. The coe¢ cient of the implicit last switch is positive
and signicant at the 1% level. The result of the coe¢ cient being equal to 1:16 is somewhat
counter-intuitive given that the constant term is not signicantly di¤erent than zero, since
this implies that subjects are slightly more risk averse in the lottery than the auction. This
is counter-intuitive because we have seen that 10 of the 15 (67%) subjects whose derived
risk parameter from the auction was outside of the bounds of that derived by the lottery
were more risk averse in the auction than in the lottery. The constant term is not reported
as being signicantly di¤erent than zero, but it is reported as negative. I have suppressed
the constant term and re-run the regression and nd that forcing the constant term to zero
returns the more intuitive result of the coe¢ cient on the implicit last switch being less than
1 (the coe¢ cient is equal to 0:93). The most important result is that the coe¢ cient is close
to one. This means that not only is the behavior correlated, but subjects are behaving the
same way in each institution.
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Table 3.9: Subjects last switch in lottery and implicit last switch derived from the auction
Subject LS (actual) LS (implicit) Subject LS (actual) LS (implicit)
1 7 7 16 7 8
2 7 7 19 7 7
3 7 8 20 10 8
4 4 7 21 5 8
5 7 8 22 5 7
6 5 7 24 9 8
9 7 6 26 8 8
10 4 8 28 8 8
12 6 7 29 8 8
13 10 8 30 4 5
15 10 9 31 6 6
3.5 Conclusion
When developing economic models, certain assumptions are made. One assumption com-
monly made is that individuals will respond to uncertainty in a consistent way. Individuals
may be di¤erent, but there is internal consistency to their behavior (Joe is not the same as
John, but Joe behaves the same way in di¤erent institutions). Recent laboratory experiments
have questioned the validity of this assumption. I add to this literature by having the same
subjects participate in two di¤erent institutions (the Holt and Laury lottery and a rst price
auction) that allow for inferences to be made about their risk tolerance. A nice feature of the
two institutions I have used is that they do not rely on specic utility functions for analysis
of risk preferences. Though it is possible to back out specic parameters if they are desired.
Subjects in my experiment behave consistently with subjects in past experiments given
the same institution. So, there is nothing special about my subject pool in this regard.
Further the behavior of the group across institutions is similar. The most important result is
that individuals behave consistently across these two institutions. Using the non-parametric
measures, I nd that subjects who are more risk averse in one institution are likely to be
more risk averse in the other institution. Beyond that, I nd that the parametric estimates
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Table 3.10: Results of regressing the actual last switch on the implicit last switch, and results
of same regression with a suppressed constant
Coef. Std. Err. t P>jtj
Last Switch (implicit) 1.16 0.38 3.04 0.006
Constant -1.79 2.86 -0.63 0.539
Coef. Std. Err. t P>jtj
Last Switch (implicit) 0.93 0.045 20.69 0.000
Constant - - - -
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Figure 3.4: Scatterplot of derived CRRAM risk parameter from the lottery and the auction
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Figure 3.5: Scatterplot of the actual last switch made by subjects on implicit last switch
derived by subject behavior in the auction
derived by using the CRRA model hold up quite well across institutions.
These results do not allow me to generalize that individuals will always behave with
consistent risk preferences in all institutions. There is still the question of what was
happening in the BDM mechanism in past research. Isaac and James (2000) is titled Just
Who Are You Calling Risk Averse?, and there is a question in the literature of whether
subjects in rst price auctions merely bid as ifrisk averse. My results support the argument
that subjects bid as ifrisk averse because they are, in fact, risk averse.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Experimental Instructions
Experiment Instructions I
In each round of this series you will be asked to make a choice between two lotteries that
will be labeled A and B. There will be a total of 10 rounds and after you have made your
choice for all 10 rounds, one of those rounds will be randomly chosen to be played. Lottery
A will always give you the chance of winning a prize of $2.00 or $1.60, while lottery B will
give you the chance of winning $3.85 or $0.10. Each decision round will involve changing
the probabilities of your winning the prizes. For example in round 1, your decision will be
represented on the screen in front of you (activate program now):
Your decision is between these two lotteries:
Lottery A: A random number will be drawn between 1 and 100. You will win
$1.60 if the number is between 1-90 (90 % chance)
$2.00 if the number is between 91 and 100 (10 % chance)
Lottery B: A random number will be drawn between 1 and 100. You will win
$0.10 if the number is between 1 and 90 (90% chance)
$3.85 if the number is between 91 and 100 (10% chance)
If you were to choose lottery B and this turns out to be the round actually played, then
the computer will generate a random integer between 1 and 100 with all numbers being
equally likely. If the number drawn is between 1 and 90, then you would win $0.10 while
if the number is between 91 and 100, then you would win $3.85. Had you chosen lottery
A then if the number drawn were between 1 and 90 you would win $1.60 while a number
between 91 and 100 would earn you $2.00.
All of the other 9 choices will be represented in a similar manner. Each will give you
the probability of winning each prize as well as translate that probability into the numerical
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range the random number has to be in for you to win that prize.
At the end of the 10 choice rounds, you will be asked to press a button that will allow
the computer to determine your payment. When you do so, the computer will randomly
pick one of the 10 rounds to base your payment on, remind you of the choice you made in
that round and draw the random number between 1 and 100 to determine your earnings.
Are there any questions before you begin making your decisions?
We ask that you follow the rules of the experiment and in particular we again ask that
you do not talk or look at the screens of other participants during the experiment. Anyone
who violates the rules may be asked to leave the experiment with only the $10.00 show-up
fee.
You will now start the sequence of 10 choices. You will be able to go through the choices
at your own pace, but we will not be able to continue the experiment until everyone has
completed this series.
So now please look at your computer screen, you can determine your choice by clicking on
the circle beside it. Now you may begin making your choices. Please do not talk to anyone
while you are doing this; raise your hand if you have a question.
Experiment Instructions II
In this part of the experiment, you will be a bidder in an auction. You are one member
in a group of four. On your handout you will see something called your valuethis is how
much the item that you are bidding on is worth to you, the other three players have their
own value. You have to decide how much you are willing to bid for this object, given your
value. You will be bidding against 3 other people in this room. The person who submits
the highest bid (on the handout you will see a box marked your bid) will be the winner of
the auction. The winner of the auction will earn their value minus their bid. For example,
assume your value is 65, and you bid 55. If 55 is the highest bid, your prot would be
65-55=10.
You will see, on the second page of your handout, what the winning bidders screen will
look like at the end of a round. Notice that winning bidis equal to your bid.If more than
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one person submits the same bid, and this is the winning bid, the computer will randomly
select a winner from those that were tied. On this handout, your valueis 53, and your
bid is 45, therefore your earnings for the round are 53 45 = 8 ECUs (100 ECUs =
$2.00).
The computer procedure used to get your value,and the values of the other members
of your group, mimics drawing numbered balls from a container. For each round, a container
would contain 100 balls uniquely numbered with the numbers 1,2, and 3, and so on through
100. This means the highest value anyone in your group could have is 100 and the lowest
value is 1. Your value gives you no information about the other group membersvalues.
There will be 20 rounds for this portion of the experiment
Experiment Instructions II
In this part of the experiment, you will be a bidder in an auction. You are one member in
a group of four. On your handout you will see something called your value this is how
much the item that you are bidding on is worth to you, the other three players have their
own value. Your value will be a random integer between 0 and 100, with all numbers being
equally likely. Your valueis randomly selected for each member of your group. It is highly
likely that all the members in your group all have di¤erent values.
You have to decide how much you are willing to bid for the object, given your value. You
will be bidding against 3 other people in this room. The person who submits the highest bid
(on the handout you will see a box marked your bid) will be the winner of the auction.
The winner of the auction will earn their value minus their bid. For example, assume your
value is 65, and you bid 55. If 55 is the highest bid, your prot would be 65-55=10. If you
do not win, you earn zero.
You will start this portion of the experiment with 25 ECUs. If you bid above your value
(i.e. your bidis greater than your value), and you win the item, you will make losses,
and they will be subtracted form your initial 25 ECUs. You are not prohibited from bidding
above your value, but you can ensure that you never make losses as long as you never bid
above your value.
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You will see, on the second page of your handout, what the winning bidders screen will
look like at the end of a round. Notice that winning bidis equal to your bid.If more than
one person submits the same bid, and this is the winning bid, the computer will randomly
select a winner from those that were tied. On this handout, your valueis 53, and your
bid is 45, therefore your earnings for the round are 53 45 = 8 ECUs (100 ECUs =
$4.00).
There will be 30 rounds for this portion of the experiment
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CHAPTER 4
Why Work When You Can Shirk? Worker
Productivity in an Experimental Setting
4.1 Introduction
There is a long standing and mature theoretical literature dealing with the principal-agent
problem (Mirrlees (1975), Grossman and Hart (1983)). A key aspect of the principal-agent
problem is the motivation of workers who are rational cheaters. Nagin (2002) denes a
rational cheater as someone who will shirk when the marginal benet of doing so exceeds the
marginal cost. A rational cheater will exert low e¤ort on the job if he thinks he can get away
with it. Recent reports estimate that shirking workers cost employers billions of dollars in
productivity losses yearly1. Employers (principals) who are aware of the nancial incentives
they are giving employees (agents) may introduce a monitoring system with performance
goals to alleviate the perceived problem. These issues with worker motivation are di¢ cult
and complex. Consider a recent New York City court case:
On March 9, 2006, John B. Sooner, a New York City administrative law judge,
recommended that Toquir Choudhri, a 14-year veteran of the city Department
of Education, receive only a reprimand for disobedience, even though supervisors
wanted him red for using the Internet for personal matters2. Spooner wrote
that Choudhri credibly stated that he completed all assignments given to him
1Frauenheim, Ed. "Stop Reading This Headline and Get Back to Work." CNET, Monday, July 11, 2005,
http://news.com.com/Stop+reading+this+headline+and+get+back+to+work/2100-1022_3-5783552.html
2Klopott, Freeman. "Should You Be Fired for Using the Internet While at Work?" PC World, Tuesday,
May 02, 2006, http://pcworld.com/article/id,125597-page,1/article.html?RSS=RSS
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by his boss and used the internet while he awaited further assignments. These
statements were corroborated by the absence of proof that Choudhri was ever
criticized for poor productivity or for not completing specic assignments.2 The
New York City Chancellor of Education, Joel Klein, decided to re Choudhri
anyway. Klein stated that the penalty of termination is appropriate and not
shocking to ones sense of fairness, .... Choudhris abuse of the Internet at the
time he is supposed to be performing his job demonstrates his disinterest in the
job.3
The worker in the above case was red for shirking on the job when his employer found
him surng the internet. The worker did not think he deserved to be red because he had
completed all of his assignments. The worker thought he was being monitored in regard to
fulllment of some quota, and he had fullled his quota, but the employer disagreed. This
case demonstrates the problems caused when the monitoring system is not well delineated,
but it also shows how concerned some employers are about any behavior consistent with
shirking. In this paper, I will examine how well these types of schemes work when they are
clearly stated and consistently enforced. I will contrast my results with previous research
which showed that workers may work harder than required by explicit nancial incentives.
Past experimental research (Cadsby et al. (2004), Dickinson and Villeval (2005)) has
shown that some workers in a laboratory setting work without incentives. It is important to
investigate if these laboratory results indicate behaviors we would see in a real work setting,
or if the possibility exists that these observations are an artifact of the experimental design.
This paper attempts to place subjects in a more rened laboratory setting to get a cleaner
look at subject behavior towards work e¤ort with low nancial incentives. Cadsby et al.
(2004), and Dickinson and Villeval (2005) were not specically looking at e¤ort with low
incentives, so there is much remaining value to their research even if the observations of
subjects working without incentives are an artifact of their design.
2Department of Education v. Choudhri, New York City O¢ ce of Administrative Trials and Hearings,
No. 722/06 (3/9/06)
3Associated Press. "NYC Fires Man For Web Surng At Work." CBS News,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/05/06/tech/main1596034.shtml
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A common approach used in the laboratory to investigate the principal-agent problem
is to give subjects a cost function and have them choose some e¤ort level. Nalbantian and
Schotter (1997), for example presents an experiment in which a subject is monitored with
probability. If the subject is not expending a certain level of e¤ort, he will be terminated.
The e¤ortin this case is not physical exertion but rather a gurative e¤ort. This number
they pick is indeed interpreted as e¤ort and therefore has the property that e¤ort is now
explicit. While this matches clearly with their models, it is not clear that subjects perceive
this choice as analogous to physical or mental exertion. The (e) chosen by the subject is
costly to the subject but it is possible that this is too abstract to model real work. Putting
the workers through a real e¤ort experiment will allow an answer as to whether simply
choosing e¤ort garners the same behavior as exerting e¤ort, and if it does not, one can be
condent that the real e¤ort experiment is a better proxy for the workplace.
While an agents outside option can be represented rather easily in a theoretical
framework, it is not so trivial to do in a laboratory. To think of this one must place himself
in the position of the subject in the experiment. The subject arrives at the laboratory and is
assigned a computer terminal. He is given the option of engaging some task and earning X
or he can take the outside option (sit still) and earn Y. If the disparity between the outside
option and the participation option is not large, there exists the possibility that the subject
will engage the game to avoid boredom.
The aforementioned research by Cadsby et al. (2004), and Dickinson and Villeval (2005)
found that subjects contribute e¤ort even when they have no nancial reason to do so. The
idea of a moral imperative not to shirk is given as a reason for this behavior by Dickinson.
Cadsbys experiment gives subjects seven scrambled letters and the subjects are instructed
to make as many words as possible in a given time period. The subjects are allowed to
choose a piece rate or a at rate scheme, the piece rate will pay them per word, and the
at rate will give them some stated amount with no requirement on word creation. These
incentives should lead students who think they are endowed with word creation ability and
low e¤ort cost to choose the piece rate scheme and the subjects who have high e¤ort cost or
are not good at word creation to choose the at rate scheme. The interesting observation
is that there are signicantly more than zero words created by the subjects who choose the
at rate scheme. This is contrary to the incentive structure, and one would not believe the
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students feel a moral imperative to unscramble letters. Dickinson and Villeval (2005) use
a real e¤ort task and they observe that some of the subjects (25%) contribute at or above
the desired output level even when monitoring is set to zero. Dickinson, as noted earlier,
suggests this as either intrinsic motivation or integrity and commitment to moral principles.
It is possible that subjects feel a moral imperative because they are interacting with a human
principal, but that is not the case in Cadsby (2004). The intrinsic motivation argument is
plausible in both experiments. The subjects might enjoy unscrambling letters, and they
might enjoy moving along a curve to get a high value, but it is not clear that observations
made under these conditions should be interpreted as analogous to intrinsic motivation one
might experience in the real world. In both experiments, the subjects could engage in e¤ort,
or do nothing. It is possible that they were engaging the tasks because they were bored.
This is similar to Choudris claim that he browsed the internet only because he had no other
work to do. If the subjects in the experiment do not engage the task, they have nothing else
to do.
Other experiments have shown that outside options have important e¤ects. Lei, Plott,
and Noussair (2001) show that excess trading in an asset market can be reduced by giving
subjects something to do beyond trading in the asset market. Pevnitskaya and Palfrey (2004)
show that over entry into an auction can be reduced by allowing subjects an outside option of
a computerized version of rock-paper-scissors. Van Dijk et al. (2001) conduct an experiment
where subjects are enabled to work on two tasks in the same period. The earnings from
one task go in to a group account while the earnings from the other task go in to a private
account, similar to a public goods game. This alleviates the e¤ort only due to boredom
problem that is plausible in the Cadsby(2004) and Dickinson (2004) papers. The specic
task the paper uses has the subjects search a grid looking for the highest payo¤. The idea
of having two of these for the subjects to play cures the boredom critique.
The experimental design for this paper allows for subjects to play a valuable outside
option. This should eliminate play in the primary task when there is no nancial incentive
to play the primary task. Then the question of how much monitoring is necessary to get the
desired amount of e¤ort can be addressed. The desired amount of e¤ort will be explicit in
terms of a quota.
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Table 4.1: Task A
Probability of being monitored: 25%
Quota: 2
Number Completed: 2
Type this: 7072
Enter here:
You entered:
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 contains the experimental design, section 4.3
contains a simple model of predicted behavior in the experiment, and section 4.4 reports
analysis of the results of the experiment. Finally, there will be some concluding remarks.
4.2 Experimental Design
The experiment conducted for this paper was designed to give subjects incentives similar
to those faced by many workers. There are 30 periods in the experiment, and each period
lasts 45 seconds with 30 seconds between each period.. The experiment consists of a primary
task (Task A) and a secondary task (Task B). The subjects can choose to split e¤ort, at
their discretion, between the two tasks. Task A is designed to mimic work for an employer.
The subject will view a randomly generated four-digit number and his task is to type the
same number in the space provided. Every time a subject has completed typing the number,
he can hit a button and start on a new randomly generated number. An example of this
can be seen in Table 4.1. The payo¤ to the subjects depends on the quota they face and
a monitoring level. The subjects earn an e¤ective wage of 300 ECUs per period. If they
are monitored and the amount of four-digit numbers typed is less than the quota they are
considered red without pay, and their earnings are zero. If a subject is not monitored, he
earns 300 ECUs from Task A regardless of whether or not his quota is met.
The other task subjects can engage in (Task B) is a matching pennies game, shown in
Table 4.2, that they will play against a computer opponent. The computer is playing a
Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium of choosing heads 50% of the time and tails 50% of the
time. The matching pennies game was chosen because it is a cognitively easy task, and the
chosen payo¤s have the property that the expected utility is increasing in the amount of
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Table 4.2: Matching Pennies
Computer
Heads Tails
Subject Heads 2,0 0,2
Tails 0,2 2,0
time spent on the task. This is intended to mimic the utility a subject would receive from
shirking, whether it be reading the newspaper, talking to friends, or browsing the internet.
Without Task B, it is possible that the subject would play Task A simply because they are
bored and nd Task A more stimulating than sitting quietly. With Task B, the subjects
could still choose to sit still, but they now have the alternative action involving activity of
an outside option that they can earn money by playing.
Any earnings from Task B are in addition to the 300 ECUs earned in Task A, but they
are not guaranteed. If the subject is monitored in task 1, and their number completed is less
than their quota, any earnings they made in Task B are wiped out. This is a punishment akin
to getting red. One could argue that the subject should keep their outside earnings since an
employer can re an employee without pay, but cannot take away the utility they received
from shirking. There will be some ne associated with getting red and for simplicity the
amount of that ne will be equal to the earnings form Task B. This is done to exact some
punishment beyond lost wages. In the laboratory, the worker will be rehired the next period,
so just taking away the wages for one period is not punitive enough. Regardless of how much
is potentially earned on Task B, a subject who is monitored and has not met his quota always
earns 0 ECUs for the period.
In order to observe the subjects responses to a variety of situations, there were 6 di¤erent
monitoring levels (0%, 15%, 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100%) and 5 di¤erent quotas (8, 12, 15,
183, and 25). This led to 30 combinations of monitoring levels and quotas and each subject
faced each combination once. This resulted in the 30 periods mentioned before. The order
that the subjects saw the various quotas and monitoring levels was determined randomly
3The quota level of 18 only applies to subjects 9-32. The rst 8 subjects had a quota of three
instead of 18.
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prior to the experiment. At the end of every period the subjects would see a screen that
would inform them whether or not they were monitored, and their payo¤ at the end of each
period.
The experiment was conducted over four sessions and 32 subjects participated. The
subjects for the experiment were undergraduate students at the Florida State University.
The experiment was computer based and conducted with z-Tree software (Fischbacher 1999).
When the subjects arrived, they were assigned to computer terminals. The instructions for
the experiment (see Appendix) were read aloud and subjects had a chance to ask questions.
The subjects were paid a $10.00 show up fee, and were able to earn money based upon their
performance in the experiment. The average earnings per subject for the experiment were
$24.96.
4.3 Theory
Given the incentive structure in the experiment, we can now develop a model to predict
the behavior of the subjects. Let t be the amount of time a subject spends on Task A, let
m 2 (0; 1) be the monitoring level the subject faces at the beginning of each period, let Q
2 (3; 25) be the quota the subject faces at the beginning of each period. Let i(t) be the
payo¤ a subject receives for working on Task B (di
dt
< 0 because the more time a subject
spends on Task A, the less time they have for Task B). The probability that a subject meets
the quota (Q) in time (t) is represented by the term Pi (t; Q) : This probability is increasing
in t
 
dPi
dt
> 0

, because the more time spent on Task A, the more likely they are to meet the
quota; Pi (t; Q) is decreasing in Q

dPi
dQ
< 0

because the higher the quota, the more di¢ cult
it is to meet it given the 45 second time constraint. Both i(t); and Pi (t; Q) are individual
specic due to the heterogeneity in subject ability (subjects who are good at Task A could
also be good at Task B, but that is irrelevant to the analysis of this problem). Recall that
subjects can earn 300 ECUs each period if they meet the quota, or are not monitored. The
payo¤ function subjects face can be represented as:
i (t; Q;m) = mPi (t; Q) (300 + i(t)) + (1 m) (300 + i(t)) (4.1)
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This payo¤ function shows that if a subject is not monitored, they receive (300 + i(t)) ;
if they are monitored they only receive (300 + i(t)) if they meet the quota, which happens
with probability Pi (t; Q) : In order to demonstrate some implications of this basic model I
will assume simplifying assumptions for i and Pi. Let i(t) = a  bt , and
Pi (t; Q) =

ct
Q
for ct  Q
1 for ct > Q
The results I derive are not special to these functional forms, but will hold for a broad range
of functions satisfying the conditions: di
dt
< 0 and dPi
dt
> 0: Equation 4.1 now becomes:
i (t; Q;m) = m
ct
Q
(300 + a  bt) + (1 m) (300 + a  bt) (4.2)
The general problem is to maximize i given some t  T:
max
tT
i (t; Q;m) = mPi (t; Q) (300 + i(t)) + (1 m) (300 + i(t)) (4.3)
The solution is:
t =
1
2
300mc+mca  bQ+mbQ
mcb
: (4.4)
Given this solution I can show the following points.
Implication 1: When the monitoring level is zero, a subject should not work on Task
A.
When there is no monitoring, equation 4.1 becomes:
i = (300 + i(t)) (4.5)
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As stated earlier, the function i(t) is declining everywhere in t, any time spent on
Task A means less earnings can be made in Task B. So, di
dt
< 08t. Therefore, to max
Ui = (300 + i(t)) ; a subject should choose t = 0; and we should observe subjects playing
only Task B.
Implication 2: As the monitoring level increases, a subject should spend more time on
Task A.
dt
dm
=
d
 
1
2
300mc+mca bQ+mbQ
mcb

dm
=
1
2
Q
m2c
> 0 (4.6)
As the monitoring level increases, shirking behavior is more likely to be punished. To
avoid this punishment, a subject has to meet the quota. So, as the monitoring level increase,
a subject should spend more time on Task A.
Implication 3: If the subject chooses to work on Task A, once he meets the quota, he
should spend no additional time on Task A.
If 9 bt s:t: Pi  bt; Q = 1, any t > bt will reduce the subjects expected utility. Let
Pi
 bt; Q = 1; and let t > bt:
If subject chooses t = bt : i = m  300 + i(bt)+ (1 m)  300 + i(bt) = 300 + i(bt):
If subject chooses t = t : i = m (300 + i(t
)) + (1 m) (300 + i(t)) = 300 + i(t):
300 + i(bt) > 300 + i(t) since t > t0 and i is decreasing in t:
Implication 4: For a given monitoring level, the subject will increase observed e¤ort as
quota increases until some point, as the quota gets relatively large, they will then exert less
e¤ort on Task A.
Given that:
Pi (t; Q) =

ct
Q
for ct  Q
1 for ct > Q
we have to consider that a subject should never choose
t =
1
2
300mc+mca  bQ+mbQ
mcb
> bt
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where bt is dened by Pi  bt; Q = 1: In my example Pi (t; Q) = 1 when ct = Q: Thereforebt = Q
c
: The optimal amount of e¤ort a subject will choose is
min(t;bt) = min1
2
300mc+mca  bQ+mbQ
mcb
;
Q
c

:
t < bt when Q > 300 + a
b (m+ 1)
mc
dbt
dQ
=
d
 
Q
c

dQ
=
1
c
> 0 (4.7)
dt
dQ
=
d
 
1
2
300mc+mca bQ+mbQ
mcb

dQ
=
 1 +m
mc
< 0 (4.8)
We see in Equation 4.7 that for Q > 300+a
b(m+1)
mc a subjects e¤ort will be increasing with
Q; and in Equation 4.8 that for Q < 300+a
b(m+1)
mc a subjects e¤ort will be decreasing in Q:
Fundamentally what this is saying is that subjects will maximize their probability of earning
the 300 ECU wage when the quota is relatively low, but at some point increasing the quota
will lead to a reduction in the e¤ort (amount of numbers typed) given to Task A.
Implication 5: If the subject cannot meet the quota even if they were to spend all of
their time on Task A, he should not spend any time on Task A.
If P (t; Q) = 0 8t  T; we see that equation 4.1 reduces to Ui = (1 m) (300 + i(t)).
Again, the subject should only work on Task B.
Implication 6: If the subject cannot meet the quota even if they were to spend all of
their time on Task A, and the monitoring level is 100%, observations of the subjects playing
either task would imply that they would rather engage the experiment than sit still.
If m = 1, equation 4.1 becomes:
i = Pi (t; Q) (300 + i(t)) (4.9)
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If P (t; Q) = 08t  T; then equation 4.9 is equal to zero. The subject gets zero nancial
gain from either task, so the subject should not engage either task unless they prefer it to
sitting still.
Given these implications, we should expect the subjects to only play Task B when the
monitoring level is zero, and to increase their e¤ort on Task A as monitoring is increased.
The subjects should also increase their e¤ort on Task A when the quota increases if the
quota is relatively low. An increase in the quota beyond some point will lead the subjects
to reduce e¤ort on Task A. If a subject meets the quota in a given period, he should then
switch to playing only Task B as he no longer has any nancial incentive to play Task A.
When the quota is unattainable, the subjects should not try to reach the quota but instead
spend all of their time on Task B. If the quota is unattainable and the subject is denitely
going to be monitored, any engagement of either Task A or Task B implies that the subject
prefers engaging the experiment to sitting still.
4.4 Experimental Results
Result 1: When the monitoring level is zero, ninety-one percent of the subjects do not meet
or exceed the quota. However, when the quota is small, many subjects meet that quota.
Table 4.3 shows that subjects are highly unlikely to exert e¤ort when they are not being
monitored. Whereas Implication 1 suggests that subjects should exert zero e¤ort when the
monitoring level is set to zero, the data show that some subjects do meet the quota when the
monitoring level is 0%. Dickinson and Villeval (2005) found that 25% of subjects contributed
at or above the desired output level; I nd less than that. Table 4.3 shows that there are
14 out of 152 (09%) observations where the subject meets or exceeds the quota. But, we
have to note that not all subjects could reach all quotas. Only one subject in the entire
experiment met Q = 25, ve subjects met Q = 18, seventeen subjects met Q = 15, all thirty
two subjects met Q = 8, and Q = 12. So, to get another estimate of worker e¤ort when
monitoring level is zero I can use the the highest observed e¤ort level for each subject to
note if someone had the ability to meet a given quota. This leads to 14 out of 87 (16%)
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Table 4.3: Subject e¤ort when monitoring level is zero
number of four-digit numbers typed when m=0%
Quota 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 NC=Q NC>Q Period
8 21 8 3 0 0 7 3 7
12 26 2 3 1 0 2 1 10
15 29 2 1 0 0 1 0 17
18 21 1 2 0 0 0 0 21
25 14 13 5 0 0 0 0 2
workers meeting or exceeding the quota when the monitoring level is zero. This estimate is
not perfect as it has the ability to underestimate shirking. Some subjects may have been
able to meet quotas that they were not observed to meet if they had worked harder. Best
stated, when monitoring level is zero, the percentage of workers that meet or exceed the
quota is in the range of 9% to 16%. Furthermore, most of the observations where workers
meet or exceed the quota, 10 out of 14 (71%) ; occur when the quota is relatively low (Q=8).
When Q > 8 and monitoring is zero, only 4 out of 55 (07%) subjects meet or exceed the
quota.
To test Implications 2 and 4, I run a linear random e¤ects panel regression. This type of
regression controls for omitted variables that di¤er between subjects and omitted variables
that vary within subjects over time. I will regress the amount of four-digit numbers typed on
monitoring level (Implication 2 ), quota less than 15, and quota greater than 15 (Implication
4). The regressor, dummyQ<15; is set to 1 when Q < 15 and zero when Q > 15; dummyQ>15
is set to 1 when Q > 15 and zero when Q < 15. If subjects respond in the experiment as
predicted by Implication 4 they will increase e¤ort up until some Q; and then begin to reduce
e¤ort. If this is the case, I need a constant for both situations. The regressor dummyperiod5
is set to 1 for periods 1-5 and zero otherwise. This is used to determine if behavior in the rst
ve periods is signicantly di¤erent than play in latter periods. This could be a factor if the
subjects experience any learning e¤ects in the rst ve periods. Prior to the experiment, it
is unlikely that the subjects know how many four-digit-numbers they can type in 45 seconds;
the subjects may use the initial periods to gauge their ability. Table 4.4 reports the results
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Table 4.4: Results of linear random e¤ects panel regression of number of four-digit numbers
typed on possible explanatory variables.
Coef. Std. Err P-value
Monitoring .0786 .0040 0.000
quota( <15) .5140 .0742 0.000
quota( >15) -.9551 .0440 0.000
dummyQ<15 1.404 .8858 0.281
dummyQ>15 6.257 1.002 0.000
dummyperiod5 1.850 .3807 0.000
Number of Groups 32
Observations/Group 30
of this regression.
Result 2: Monitoring has a positive signicant impact on e¤ort given to task 1.
Table 4.4 shows that as monitoring increases subjects choose to exert more e¤ort
(type more numbers) on the monitored task. This result is consistent with Implication 2.
Specically, if monitoring goes up by one percentage point, the average subject increases the
amount of four-digit numbers by 7.9%. Figure 4.1 is a scatterplot of four-digit-numbers typed
on quota for a given monitoring level. Figure 4.1 allows us to see the impact of monitoring
in a sequence. There are 960 observations in each cell. The data have been jittered due to
the high level of overlap of the data points. The dark spots in each cell represent the most
overlap. We see that when the monitoring level is low, observations are clustered around
zero e¤ort. As monitoring increases the mass of observations starts to move up, and when
monitoring is at 100% we see a very strong correlation between the quota and the amount
typed. If we look at Figure 4.1 we see that the subjects are exerting e¤ort where monitoring
is zero and Q = 25: The subjects saw this combination of quota and monitoring level early
in the experiment (period 2). The signicance of the regressor dummyperiod5 in Table 4.4
shows that subjects were playing di¤erently early in the experiment. It is possible that the
subjects were exploring the game space.
Result 3: Once subjects meet the quota in Task A, most switch to Task B exclusively.
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Figure 4.1: Subject e¤ort given a constant monitoring level
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Figure 4.2: Subject e¤ort given a constant quota
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If we refer back to Figure 4.2 we see few observations where the amount typed is greater
than the quota. Consider the case where monitoring is equal to 100%, there are 70 instances
where the amount typed is greater than or equal to the quota, of these 70 instances, 62 hit
the quota exactly. In Figure 4.2, we can observe that the number typed is rarely above the
quota.
Result 4: The quota level, for quota less than 15, has a positive signicant impact on
e¤ort. The quota level, for quota greater than 15, has a negative signicant impact.
Table 4.4 shows that, consistent with Implication 4, when the quota is relatively small
subjects increase their e¤ort on Task A. However, when the quota is greater than 15 subjects
e¤ort is decreasing as the quota increases. We can see in Figure 4.2 that when the quota
increases from 8 to 12, there is an increase in the amount of e¤ort given to Task A. When
the quota increases to 15, we can see a drop o¤ in the e¤ort given to Task A, particularly
when monitoring is less than 50%.
Result 5: When the quota is set to 25, this is e¤ectively P (t; Q) = 0 8t; and monitoring
is less than 100%, subjects prefer to spend more time on Task B than Task A.
Prior to the experiment, the quota level of 25 was believed to be so high that no subject
could hit it, and would therefore be implicitly unattainable. This held true for 30 of the
32 subjects, but one subject was able to reach Q = 25 and another was able to type 24
four-digit numbers: In the minds of these two subjects, the quota of 25, was probably not
unattainable. The other subjects never typed as much as 20 four-digit numbers. So, for
30 of the 32 subjects, Q = 25 should have been inferred as unattainable. Implication 3
demonstrated that if a subject could not meet the quota even if they spent all of their time
on Task A, then they should not try to meet the quota. Table 4.5 shows that when subjects
think they cannot meet the quota, they will not try to meet the quota. If we contrast this
unattainable quota with the high quota of 18, we see that the subjects exert much more
e¤ort when there is at least some possibility that they might reach the quota. Consider, for
example, the case where monitoring = 50%.When the quota is 25, the number of subjects
that type ve or fewer four-digit numbers is 26 out of 32 (81%); when the quota is 18, the
number of subjects that type ve or fewer four-digit numbers is 5 out of 24 (21%). If we
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Table 4.5: Subject e¤ort when Q=25
number of four-digit numbers typed when Q=25
Mon. Level 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 NC=Q Period
0% 14 13 5 0 0 0 2
15% 31 0 0 1 0 0 24
30% 25 3 2 1 1 0 13
50% 26 3 0 2 1 0 19
75% 15 6 8 2 1 0 8
100% 12 5 9 4 2 1 30
Table 4.6: Subject e¤ort when Q=18
number of four-digit numbers typed when Q=184
Mon. Level 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 NC=Q Period
0% 21 1 2 0 0 0 21
15% 20 1 2 1 0 1 20
30% 22 1 6 1 0 1 28
50% 5 9 8 2 0 1 6
75% 9 1 11 3 0 1 26
100% 1 6 10 7 0 1 23
look to Figure 4.2 we can see that e¤ort given to Task A is much greater when the quota is
15 compared to when the quota is 25. Result 1 showed that some subjects will meet easily
attainable quotas even without nancial incentives. Result 5 shows that unattainable quotas
will cause subjects to greatly reduce e¤ort.
Result 6: When the Quota is set to 25 (P (t; Q) = 0 8t);and the monitoring level is
set to 100%, subjects do not sit still, they engage both Task A and Task B.
Table 4.7 shows when monitoring is 100% and Q = 25 many subjects exert e¤ort even
though they know they will not meet the quota. One subject was extremely fast and did
meet the quota, another made it to 24. No one else made it to 20. Seven subjects engaged
neither task, two subjects engaged both, three subjects played only the outside option, and
twenty engaged only the typing task. Similar to this result, both Cadsby et al. (2004),
and Dickinson and Villeval (2005) found subjects contributing without nancial incentives.
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Table 4.7: Subject e¤ort when monitoring level is 1
number of four-digit numbers typed when m=100%
Quota 0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 NC=Q NC>Q Period
8 0 28 4 0 0 27 4 5
12 2 3 26 0 1 24 1 22
15 0 4 25 3 0 9 3 14
18 1 6 10 7 0 1 0 23
25 12 5 9 4 2 1 0 30
Result 6 lends support to the claim that subjects will engage tasks simply because they are
bored. One could argue that since the only possible way a subject could get any earnings
was to try and reach the quota, e¤ort given to Task A was not play due to boredom. While
this is plausible, it is not likely given the intensity of e¤ort given to Task A. If we look at
Tables 4.5 and 4.6, when monitoring is set to 100%, we see that work intensity is higher for
Q = 18. Consider that when Q = 25 only 15 out of 32 (47%) subjects type more than 10
numbers, but when Q = 18 17 out of 24 (71%) subjects type more than 10 numbers. So, the
workers who choose to give e¤ort to Task A when monitoring is 100% and Q = 25 do not
appear to be exerting high e¤ort, and that is consistent with play due to boredom.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper presented an experimental study of worker productivity. The main objective of
the paper was to examine the e¤ect of various incentive schemes on subject behavior in an
environment that is meant to mimic a work setting where the worker has the ability to shirk
by engaging in some task other than work for the employer. A secondary objective of the
paper was to examine past experimental results that showed subjects exerting e¤ort when
no nancial incentive to do so existed, and determine if this was consistent with play due to
boredom.
The key nding of this paper is that workers in a laboratory work setting with an outside
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option available to them do shirk, but monitoring is quite successful at reducing shirking.5
In fact, when the quota is not di¢ cult to attain, very little monitoring is necessary to gain
subject compliance. However, when the quota is unattainable, the subjects revolt and exert
very little e¤ort. When there is no monitoring, I do observe that some subjects may still have
some intrinsic motivation to play the primary task, but less than previous work reported.
Another nding is that by allowing subjects to participate in an outside option, I am able
to mitigate play that is due to boredom. And by implicitly disallowing earnings we are able
to see that subjects prefer to play tasks instead of sitting still.
Subjects in this experiment were observed to work until they met their quota and then
switched to the outside option. This paper began with the story of a worker who was red
for a lack of productivity. But it is not clear that he was shirking. Once he completed his
assignments, or met his quota, he played the outside option available to him. This is the
exact behavior subjects exhibited in the laboratory.
Future work will examine if subjects who are monitored over any shirking behavior exert
more e¤ort on their primary task than subjects monitored over performance goals. The issue
of self selection will also be examined by paying subjects based on the amount of numbers
they type as opposed to a at wage. Subjects will then be allowed to choose the pay for
performance scheme or the at wage and monitoring scheme.
4.6 Appendix: Experiment Instructions
In this part of the experiment you will be able to work on two tasks. You can split your
time among the tasks however you choose. Meaning you can spend all of your time on task
A and none on task B, all of your time on task B and none on task A, or some combination
of task A and task B. Each round in this experiment is 45 seconds long.
In the box marked task A on your handout a number is displayed. Your task is to type the
number you see in the box provided. Every time you click the OKbutton, a new number
will come up and you can go through the task again. In each round of the experiment, the
5This is also consistent with a model by Stevens and Thevaranjan (2007) that allows for ethical behavior.
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default payment for task A is 300 ECUs (1000 ECUs = $1.00). Payment will be further
described below.
If you look at your handout, you will see two other pieces of information for task A
(Quota and Probability of being monitored).
Monitoring means that the computer is checking to make sure that you have met the
quota (dened in next paragraph). The monitoring leveltells you how likely it is that the
computer is going to check on you. If the monitoring levelis 0%, that means the computer
will not check on you. If it is 100%, that means the computer will denitely check on you.
If you are monitored: The quotais the minimum number of task A numbers you have
to type in order to earn 300 ECUs. In other words, to earn the 300 ECUs, you must type
at least the amount of numbers specied by the quota and they must be typed correctly.
Your screen will update the amount of completed correct numbers you have typed (number
completed on your handout). If you do not type enough numbers correctly to cover the
quota, your earnings for the round are zero.
If you are not monitored: If you meet the quota you earn 300 ECUs. If you dont meet
the quota, you earn 300 ECUs.
The monitoring level is stated at the beginning of every round. At the end of each round,
the computer will generate a random number between 1 and 100 with all numbers being
equally likely to determine whether or not you are in fact monitored. For example, assume
you enter the round and the monitoring levelis set to 40 (this is a 40% chance that you
will be monitored). If the number drawn at the end of the round is between 41 and 100, you
will not be monitored. If the number drawn is between 1 and 40, you will be monitored.
Alternatively, you may also choose to work on task B (the bottom section of the handout).
In this task you will be playing a game against the computer. The computer is
programmed to pick either option H or option T. You also have the ability to pick option H
or option T (you do this by choosing H or T and then clicking the okbutton).
If both of you pick the same option you win, and earn 2 ECUs, if the choices dont match,
the computer wins, and you earn zero ECUs. However, if you are monitored in task A, and
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you did not meet the quota, whatever earnings you had accumulated in task B will be wiped
out.
The example in the handout has the monitoring level at 25 (that is a 25% chance that
you will be monitored), and the quota is set at 2. If the number completedat the end
of the 45 second round is greater than the quota, or equal to the quota, you will earn 300
ECUs from task A plus whatever you earned on task B. If number completedis less than
the quota, two things can happen:
1. You are monitored, and you earn zero for the round (zero from task A and zero
from task B)
2. You are not monitored, and you earn 300 ECUs from task A plus whatever you
earned on task B.
On the second page of your handout, the example shows a case where monitoring
occurred. However, since the quota was met, the earnings from task A are 300 ECUs.
Your total earnings are 306, because you earned 6 ECUs from task B. If the quota had not
been met, the task A earnings would be zero, and your earnings from task B would be wiped
out, so your total earnings for the round would be zero.
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CHAPTER 5
Concluding Remarks
This dissertation had three primary objectives: examining the consistency of preferenes
across instiutions; investigating shirking behavior in a real e¤ort laboratory experiment;
and examing if past experimental results that are at odds with theory could be artifacts of
experimental design.
The key contribution of chapter 3 is that I am able to show that subjects have consistent
risk preferences across institutions. This is consistent with standard assumptions, but past
experiments had called these assumptions into question. I rst show that my subject pool
is similar to past subject pools, and then bu using both non-parametricall and parametrical
tests that my subjects have consistent risk preferences. This result lends support to the
argument that subjectsbids in rst price sealed bid auctions are due to risk aversion, and
not simply consistent with a risk aversion model.
Future work will need to focus on why past experiments did not nd consistency. Specics
of these institutions along with the experimental design (in terms of both complexity of the
instructions, and complexity of the institution) will need to be examined. This will be
important for policy decisons that attempt to take experimental and theoretical results into
the eld. It could be the case that individuals are consistent if the they understand the rules,
so any implementation of policy should strive for clarity.
The key contribution of chapter 4 is that workers do shirk, but monitoring and an
attainable quota work well at mitigating shirking behavior. However, when the quota is
di¢ cult to reach, subjects are more likely to shirk. So managers have to walk a ne line in
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the intensity of work they require. It is possible that by requiring less work they end up with
more productivity. I also nd evidence that past experimental results were artifacts of their
experimental design. I designed parts of my experiment to test if workers prefer to engage a
task as opposed to sitting still, and I observe that subjects do, in fact, prefer to engage the
experiment. In any future experiments, the experimental design should take pains to ensure
that costlyparticipation overrides the cost of sitting still.
Future work in this area will examine di¤erent types of monitoring and payment schemes.
Specically, I will examine the e¤ects of monitoring on any shirking behavior. Managers may
feel that workers should not shirk at all, and any engagement of the outside options would
be punished. So instead of monitoring over some quota, they just check to make sure that
you are always working on the main task. It is possible that this could lead workers to
rebel in a more passive way. What we saw in my results was that with an outside option
and an attainable quota, subjects would work intensly to meet their quota and then play
the outside option. It could be the case that monitoring both tasks leads to less shirking
in terms subjects engaging the outside option, but this zealous monitoring could lower the
intensity of work in the primary task.
I will also examine a piece rate wage scheme. I will do this by allowing subjects to self
select into a pay for performance scheme or the current at wage scheme. This may increase
productivity because those that are best at the primary task will self select into it. This
is similar to stock brokers, who work on commission, and securities analysts, who work on
salary, but both are employed by the same rm. Once I have results on all three of these
sytems in terms of productivity, I can them analyze them from the cost side. It may not be
the case that the most productive scheme in terms of output leads to the highest prots for
the rm.
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APPENDIX
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